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INNOCENT INJURY AND LOSS DISTRIBUTION:
THE FLORIDA PURE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
SYSTEM
VINCENT S. WALKOWIAK*
INTRODUCTION
The debate regarding the judiciary's power to abandon the doctrine
of contributory negligence' ended in Florida with the Supreme Court
B.A., 1968; J.D., 1971, University of Illinois; Associate Professor of Law, Southern
Methodist University School of Law.
This article was written during the summer of 1976, and was in the publication
process when the Florida Supreme Court reversed itself after rehearing in Stuyvesant
Insurance Co. v. Bournazian, 342 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1977). The article required some
substantial last-minute changes, and the author thanks Mr. Stephen O'Hara for his
assistance in making those changes.
1. Most judicial attempts to abandon contributory negligence and adopt compara-
tive negligence have been unsuccessful in the past. For example, in Maki v. Frelk,
229 N.E.2d 284 (I11. App. Ct. 1967), reild 239 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. 1968), an Illinois appellate
court abandoned the rule of contributory negligence and adopted a form of comparative
negligence. The case had been transferred to the appellate court by the Supreme Court
of Illinois for consideration of whether the contributory negligence rule should be
changed. When the appellate court actually made the change, the supreme court re-
versed, stating that such a change should be made by the legislature. Maki v. Frelk,
239 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. 1968), revlg 229 N.E.2d 284 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967). Accord, Peterson
v. Culp, 465 P.2d 876 (Ore. 1970); see Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 281 N.W. 261
(Minn. 1938); cf. Syroid v. Albuquerque Gravel Products Co., 522 P.2d 570 (N.M. 1974)
(declining to abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence and noting the legisla-
ture's refusal to do so). The Maki decision generated much debate over the authority
and feasibility of judicial abandonment of the contributory negligence rule. See Phillips,
Maki vs. Frelk: The Rise and Fall of Comparative Negligence in Illinois, 57 ILL. B.J.
10 (1968); 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 573 (1968); 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 351; 21 VAND. L. REv. 889
(1968). See also Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 463 (1970).
Some states have adopted pure comparative negligence legislatively, thereby abrogat-
ing the contributory negligence rule. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAw § 1411 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77); R.I. GEN LAws § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1975);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1975). Georgia's comparative negligence rule
is both legislative and judicial in origin. In Flanders v. Meath, 27 Ga. 358 (1859), the
Georgia Supreme Court recognized the need for a change in the contributory negligence
rule. The Flanders court stated that there should be some form of apportionment of
damages "where both parties are in fault, but the defendant most so." Id. at 362
(dictum). See also Macon & W.R.R. v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250, 254 (1858) (dictum). As a
basis for implementing such a system, the Georgia courts turned to a statute providing
for apportionment of damages in actions against railroads when the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent. See GA. CODE ANN. § 94-703 (1972). The Georgia courts
gradually expanded this statute's application to all forms of negligence cases. See
generally Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 463 (1970).
The Florida courts had a similar opportunity when the Florida legislature adopted
a comparative negligence statute, the application of which was limited to injuries
caused by railroads when the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. See 1887 Fla. Laws,
ch. 3744, § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.06 (1975)). But the opportunity was
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of Florida's decision in Hoffman v. Jones.2 The Hoffman decision
broke a century-long stalemate by adopting the doctrine of pure com-
parative negligence. This drastic alteration of tort law in Florida
breathed new life into the common law tradition of case by case
resolution of the interstitial problems which inevitably arise from
judicial change of substantive law.3 Although the development of
rules of procedure and of substantive law under the new system is
lost when the Supreme Court of Florida declared the statute unconstitutional as
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state
constitutions. Georgia S. & F. Ry. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965).
The statute was declared unconstitutional because it was limited to cases involving
railroads. Id.
2. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). Since Hoffman, the courts of Alaska and California
have likewise abandoned the rule of contributory negligence, replacing it with the
doctrine of pure comparative negligence. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975);
Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
3. The Alaska, California, and Florida Supreme Courts all recognized that the
adoption of pure comparative negligence left many unanswered questions. See Kaatz
v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049-50 (Alas. 1975); Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d
1226, 1242 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1973). The Supreme
Court of Florida stated:
Petitioners in this cause, and various amicus curiae who have filed briefs,
have raised many points which they claim we must consider in adopting com-
parative negligence, such as the effects of such a change on the concept of
"assumption of risk," and no "contribution" between joint tortfeasors ...
... [I]t is not the proper function of this Court to decide unripe issues, without
the benefit of adequate briefing, not involving an actual controversy, and un-
related to a specific factual situation.
We are fully confident that the trial court judges of this State can adequately
handle any problems created by our change to a comparative negligence rule
as these problems arise.
280 So. 2d at 439. The Hoffman court continued:
We feel the trial judges of this State are capable of applying this comparative
negligence rule without our setting guidelines in anticipation of expected
problems. The problems are more appropriately resolved at the trial level in
a practical manner instead of a theoretical solution at the appellate level. The
trial judges are granted broad discretion in adopting such procedure as may
accomplish the objectives and purposes expressed in this opinion.
Id. at 439-40, quoted with approval in Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242
(Cal. 1975).
The Alaska, California, and Florida Supreme Courts did, however, abolish the "last
clear chance" doctrine because it existed only to ameliorate the harshness of the
contributory negligence rule. 540 P.2d at 1050; 532 P.2d at 1240; see 280 So. 2d at 438.
The Supreme Court of California, in Nga Li, also abrogated the defense of assump-
tion of risk to the extent that it was a variant of contributory negligence. 532 P.2d
at 1241, 1243. The Florida Supreme Court has recently reached the same result. "We find
no discernible basis analytically or historically to maintain a distinction between the
affirmative defense of contributory negligence and assumption of risk." Blackburn v. Dorta,
No. 46,621, slip op. at 10 (Fla. May 5, 1977), rev'g Dorta v. Blackburn, 302 So. 2d 450 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). See Hall v. Holton, 330 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976;
Parker v. Maule Industries, Inc., 321 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Rea v.
Leadership Housing, Inc., 312 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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not complete, there is now a sufficient mass of legislative and judicial
law on which to predicate an analysis of the socio-economic impact
of pure comparative negligence on loss distribution in tort.
This article will not attempt to judge the wisdom of adopting
pure comparative negligence, whether by the judiciary or by the legis-
lature; nor will it examine all the doctrine's ramifications with respect
to the concept of negligence. 4 Rather, the scope of the article is con-
fined to a consideration of loss distribution of tort injuries under
Florida's pure comparative negligence system.
A basic understanding of pure comparative negligence is essential
to the theses presented in this article. Perhaps the best way to effect
an explanation is to juxtapose the doctrine of pure comparative negli-
gence with the doctrines of contributory negligence and modified
comparative negligence.
I. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, MODIFIED COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE, AND PURE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
A. Contributory Negligence
The doctrine of contributory negligence5 totally bars recovery by
a plaintiff whose own fault contributes to his injury in however
slight a degree. Recovery is barred regardless of the obviousness of
the defendant's negligence or its causal proximity to the plaintiff's
injury. But if the plaintiff is free of causal negligence, he collects his
full damages.0
4. Comparative negligence has been amply discussed in the literature. For a short
bibliography, see George & Walkowiak, Blame and Reparation in Pure Comparative
Negligence: The Multi-Party Action, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 1 n.1, 3 n.7 (1976).
5. For the history and rationale of the doctrine, see James, Contributory Negligence,
62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953).
6. The doctrine of "last clear chance" may be ignored for purposes of this dis-
cussion. The basic tenet of the doctrine of contributory negligence is that financial
responsibility for injuries must be totally borne by the defendant or by the plaintiff.
Once it is determined that the defendant was causally negligent, the defendant avoids
financial responsibility only if the plaintiff was also causally negligent. Since the
doctrine of "last clear chance" presumes that the plaintiff's negligence was temporarily
superseded by the negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff's negligence is no longer
causal.
For a time, a few states experimented with a form of contributory negligence
which permitted juries to consider degrees of negligence. See Galena & Chi. Union R.R.
v. Jacobs. 20 111. 478 (1858); Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kan. 466, 471-72 (1872). The Illinois
plan adopted in Galena provided that the plaintiff could collect all of his damages
"wherever it shall appear that the plaintiff's negligence is comparatively slight, and
that of the defendant gross." 20 Ill. at 497. Though the jury was required to compare
the degrees of negligence, the comparison did not effect any reduction in damages.
If the plaintiff were slightly negligent and the defendant grossly negligent, the
plaintiff recovered all of his damages. By contrast, the doctrine of comparative negligence
[5:66
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Suppose that A, B, and C are involved in a multiple car collision.
They all suffer provable damages in the following amounts: A suffers
$15,000 damages; B suffers $38,000 damages; and C suffers $6,000
damages. Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, the fact
finder must determine that one party was entirely free of negligence
contributing to his own injuries before it can award that party any
damages. Now, suppose that percentages of negligence are assigned
to A, B, and C as shown in Table 1.7
TABLE 1
Provable Damages Degree of Negligence
A $15,000.00 25%
B $38,000.00 65%
C $ 6,000.00 10%
The doctrine of contributory negligence will not permit the jury to
award damages to any of the parties. Each must bear the burden of
his or her respective loss.
B. Comparative Negligence
Both in its pure and in its modified form, comparative negligence
recognizes that the plaintiff's fault should affect the plaintiff's right
to compensation. It abridges but does not eliminate contributory
negligence as a defense.8 Although under the doctrine of contributory
requires not only computations of degrees of negligence, but also a reduction in
collectable damages based upon the computations. In City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 38
N.E. 892 (Ill. 1894), Illinois summarily abandoned its experiment with "comparative"
negligence. Cf. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Morgan, 1 P. 298 (Kan. 1883).
7. Percentages of negligence are given in Table 1 for purposes of the hypothetical
and for comparison. Normally the doctrine of contributory negligence does not permit
the jury to compute degrees of negligence since any causal negligence on the plaintiff's
part precludes any recovery by him.
8. Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida stated in Hoffman:
[W]e now hold that a plaintiff in an action based on negligence will no longer
be denied any recovery because of his contributory negligence.
If it appears from the evidence that both plaintiff and defendant were guilty
of negligence which was, in some degree, a legal cause of the injury to the
plaintiff, this does not defeat the plaintiff's recovery entirely. The jury in
assessing damages would in that event award to the plaintiff such damages as
in the jury's judgment the negligence of the defendant caused to the plaintiff.
In other words, the jury should apportion the negligence of the plaintiff and
the negligence of the defendant; then in reaching the amount due the plaintiff,
the jury should give the plaintiff only such an amount proportioned with his
negligence and the negligence of the defendant.
280 So. 2d at 438. More recently, the Supreme Court of Florida stated: "We now have
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negligence the plaintiff may not collect at all if he is the least bit
at fault in causing his own injuries, the various comparative negligence
models-in varying degrees-permit the plaintiff to receive some com-
pensation for the injuries he suffered. Comparative negligence, there-
fore, represents yet another attempt to revitalize the fault system of
allocation of tort losses.
1. Modified Comparative Negligence.-Modified comparative
negligence lessens but does not obliterate the harshness of the con-
tributory negligence rule. A claimant's9 recoverable compensation is
computed by subtracting the proportion of causal negligence attributed
to him from the total damages he suffered. Whether the claimant may
recover at all is controlled by the pattern of modified comparative
negligence which the jurisdiction follows. There are three basic
patterns.
In pattern 1, the claimant may collect damages if he established
that his negligence is no more than 50% of the total computable
negligence; his recovery consists of the total damages he suffered,
reduced by the proportion of his negligence to that total.'0 For example,
consider the hypothetical figures posed in Table 1. Table 2 shows
comparative negligence, so the defense of contributory negligence is available in determin-
ing the apportionment of the negligence [in products liability actions.]" West v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90 (Fla. 1976). See also Butuad v. Suburban Marine &
Sporting Goods, 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976).
9. In a contributory negligence jurisdiction, it is procedurally and conceptually
easy to refer to the parties as plaintiff or defendant. But under certain comparative
negligence models, the possibility of multiple recoveries by parties antiquates such
procedural classifications. Therefore, to the extent that confusion does not result,
hereinafter all persons seeking damages shall be referred to as "claimants" whether they
are plaintiffs, counterclaimants, or crossclaimants.
10. Note that the claimant may recover if his negligence is found to be no greater
than the combined negligence of the parties from whom he seeks recovery. Under
this formula, a claimant may recover when his negligence is found to be less than
or equal to the combined negligence of such other parties. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-
1764 to 1765 (Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1976); KAN.
STAT. § 60-258a (Supp. 1975); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1976-77);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1975); ORE. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1975); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 2212a(l) (Vernon Supp. 1975).
Two jurisdictions which do not precisely fit the pattern 1 model, but which do
not at all fit the pattern 2 or pattern 3 models, are South Carolina and Tennessee.
South Carolina has a statute of limited application which apparently permits the
claimant to collect all of his damages if his negligence is equal to or less than the
negligence needed to establish liability. See S.C. CODE § 46-802.1 (Supp. 1975).
Tennessee follows a form of apportionment if the claimant's negligence is causally
"remote." See Bejach v. Colby, 214 S.W. 869 (Tenn. 1919). It has been suggested that,
rather thin being a system of comparative negligence, the Tennessee approach benefits
the defendant by modifying the doctrine of last clear chance. See Prosser, Comparative
Negligence, 51 MicH. L. REV. 465, 496-97 (1953); see generally Annot,, 32 A.L.R.3d 463,
479-80 (1970).
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judgments which could be computed in a jurisdiction which follows
the pattern 1 model.
TABLE 211
A is entitled to judgment for $11,25012 against B and C. 1"
B is entitled to no affirmative judgment.
C is entitled to judgment for $5,40014 against A and B.
A's negligence is less than 50%; therefore, A is entitled to judgment
against B and C jointly and severally. Likewise, C is entitled to judg-
ment against A and B jointly and severally. But B's negligence is
greater than 50%; though he suffered the greatest amount of damages,
he must not only bear the total burden of his loss, but he is also
jointly and severally liable to A and C on their judgments.
In pattern 2, the claimant may collect damages if he establishes
that his proportion of negligence is less than that of the party from
whom he is seeking compensation; his recovery consists of the total
damages he suffered, reduced by the proportion of his negligence to
the total computable negligence.1 5 For example, again consider the
11. The figures in Table 2 do not necessarily represent the amount which would
eventually be received or paid; rules of contribution, set-off, or indemnity would
affect the sums actually received or paid by the parties or their insurers. Since the
decision to adopt a system of postverdict loss distribution between the plaintiff and
defendant or among the defendants is conceptually independent of the decision to
adopt contributory or comparative negligence, the effects of postverdict loss allocation
are discussed in sections II and III of this article. Note, however, that different judg-
ments would result under Nevada's comparative negligence scheme. See notes 13, 19, 20
infra.
12. A's total damages are reduced by 25%, his percentage of negligence. Thus,
$15,000 - (25% x $15,000) = $11,250.
13. For purposes of the hypothetical, assume that joint and several liability applies.
But note that some jurisdictions have statutorily abrogated or limited the concept of
joint and several liability in their comparative negligence schemes. For example, the
Nevada statute abrogates joint and several liability where recovery is allowed against
more than one defendant. NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.141(3) (1975). And in Texas, "[e]ach
defendant is jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the judgment awarded
the claimant, except that a defendant whose negligence is less than that of the claimant
is liable to the claimant only for that portion of the judgment which represents the
percentage of negligence attributable to him." TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a(2)(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
14. C's total damages are reduced by 10%, his percentage of negligence. Thus,
$6,000 - (10% x $6,000) = $5,400.
15. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (Supp. 1975);
IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(1) (West Supp. 1976);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (West Supp. 1976-77);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (Supp. 1975); WYO. STAT. § 1-7.2 (Supp. 1975).
Montana, New Jersey, and Wisconsin follow a variation of pattern 2. In these
jurisdictions, a claimant may recover if his negligence is less than or equal to the
1977]
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hypothetical figures posed in Table 1. Table 3 shows judgments which
could be computed in a jurisdiction which follows the basic pattern
2 model.
TABLE 3
A is entitled to judgment for $11,25018 against B. 17
B is entitled to no affirmative judgment.
C is entitled to judgment for $5,4001s against A and B.
Since C's negligence is less than either A's or B's, C is entitled to judg-
negligence of the party against whom recovery is sought; the claimant's total damages
are reduced by the proportion of his negligence. See MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 58-607.1
(Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.1 (West Supp. 1976-77); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
895.045 (West Supp. 1976-77). It is interesting to note that one justice on the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin advocates adopting the pattern 1 model:
The principal difficulty here, as with many accident cases involving multiple
defendants, is the fundamental proposition that the comparison of negligence is
always made as between the individual plaintiff and each individual defendant
rather than the individual plaintiff with the several defendants that may, by
their negligence, have collectively contributed to his injuries. The unfairness of
this approach grows from the fact that one or more defendants may have con-
tributed to his injuries, yet he can recover only in those situations where he can
demonstrate that his negligence is either less than or as great but not greater
than the negligence of one or more defendants considered separately. . . . The
legislature should further amend the basic comparative negligence law in Wis-
consin to correct this inequity so as to provide for recovery based on a comparison
of the causal negligence, if any, of the person injured with the total negligence
of all the persons whose negligence contributed to the injuries. If the plaintiff
is considered less negligent, or his negligence is considered only as great as the
combined negligence of all the defendants, then he should be able to recover
from the contributing defendants in proportion to their causal negligence.
Gross v. Denow, 212 N.W.2d 2, 9-10 (Wis. 1973) (Wilkie, J., concurring). To date, the
Wisconsin legislature has not heeded this advice.
Maine follows a variation of pattern 2 similar to the variation followed by Montana,
New Jersey and Wisconsin-but with a vastly different approach. In Maine, a claimant
may recover if his negligence is less than that of the party against whom recovery is
sought, but the jury must reduce the damages recoverable to the extent they believe
"just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsibility for
the damage." ME. REv. STAT. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1976-77).
Nebraska and South Dakota follow a variation only remotely related to pattern 2.
This variation does involve a comparison of the claimant's proportion of negligence to
that of the party against whom recovery is sought. But the claimant may collect
damages only if his negligence is comparatively slight. Apportionment of damages is
based upon the slight-gross comparison. See NaB. RE. STAT. § 25-1151 (1975); S.D.
COMPILED LAwS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967). Compare this variation of pattern 2 with Galena
& Chi. Union R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 1Il. 478 (1858), discussed in note 6 supra.
16. See note 12 supra.
17. A is entitled to judgment only against B because only B is more negligent
than A.
18. See note 14 supra.
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ment against both. B, of course, remains liable to A and jointly and
severally liable to C.
Pattern 3 is like pattern 2 in that the claimant may recover if he
establishes that his proportion of negligence is less than that of the
party from whom he is seeking compensation; his recovery consists
of the total damages he suffered, reduced by the proportion of his
negligence to the whole. But pattern 3 also has an apportionment
feature. The claimant recovers individual judgments against each more
negligent tortfeasor. Where recovery is allowed against more than one
defendant, each such defendant is liable for the proportion of his
own negligence to the causal negligence of the defendants against
whom recovery is allowed. 19 Thus, pattern 3 discards the concept of
joint and several liability. The claimant, rather than the defendant,
must incur the loss for injuries caused by other tortfeasors from whom
compensation is unavailable.
For illustration of the pattern 3 mathematics, consider the Table
1 hypothetical. Table 4 shows the judgments which would result in
a pattern 3 jurisdiction. 20
19. New Hampshire and Vermont are pattern 3 jurisdictions; their statutes combine
aspects of comparative negligence and apportionment of damages among tortfeasors:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any plaintiff,
or his legal representative, to recover damages for negligence resulting in death,
personal injury, or property damage, if such negligence was not greater than
the causal negligence of the defendant, but the damages awarded shall be
diminished, by general verdict, in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributed to the plaintiff; provided that where recovery is allowed against more
than one defendant, each such defendant shall be liable for that proportion of
the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his
causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants
against whom recovery is allowed. The burden of proof as to the existence or
amount of causal negligence alleged to be attributable to a party shall rest upon
the party making such allegation.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507: 7-a (Supp. 1975); see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973).
Nevada is a pattern 1 jurisdiction for purposes of computing compensable damages;
but, like pattern 3 jurisdictions, the Nevada statute provides for apportionment of
damages severally among liable defendants. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1975).
20. Slightly different recoveries would result under the Nevada system; Nevada is
a pattern 1 jurisdiction for purposes of computing allowable recoveries, but follows a form
of the pattern 3 apportionment feature. In Nevada, A would be entitled to judgment
for $11,250: $9,750 against B and $1,500 against C. B would be entitled to no affirmative
judgment. C would be entitled to judgment for $5,400: $1,500 against A and $3,900
against B. The difference in the proportions recoverable is attributable to the language
of the Nevada statute which permits a claimant to recover against a tortfeasor in propor-
tion to that tortfeasor's negligence to the whole. Thus, A collects 10% of $15,000 from
C and 65% of $15,000 from B. C collects 25% of $6,000 from A and 65% of $6,000
from B. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.141 (1975).
1977]
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TABLE 4
A is entitled to judgment for $11,250 against B. 21
B is entitled to no affirmative judgment.
C is entitled to judgment for $5,400:
$1,512 against A and $3,888 against B. 22
Note that if B were impecunious, A and C would be forced to bear
the loss for the damages attributable to B. In pattern 1 or pattern 2
jurisdictions, this loss would be borne either by A alone or by A and
C as jointly and severally liable tortfeasors. 23
In summary, the primary feature of all modified comparative
negligence jurisdictions is the continuing reliance upon "contributory"
negligence as a total bar to recovery. The claimant must prove that
he is not more negligent than the tortfeasor(s) from whom he seeks
compensation.
2. Pure Comparative Negligence.-By comparison to either
modified comparative negligence or contributory negligence, the
doctrine of pure comparative negligence permits all of the injured
parties to recover their damages reduced only by their respective pro-
portions of negligence (self-responsibility discounts). 24 Of course, a
claimant may not recover from a non-negligent party; nor may a
claimant recover from a party who is innocent of causal negligence.25
21. A is entitled to judgment only against B since only B's negligence is greater
than A's. The computation of A's judgment is the same as in a pattern 1 or pattern
2 jurisdiction. See note 12 supra.
22. C is less negligent than either A or B; he is entitled to judgments against both.
C may recover a total of $5,400. See note 14 supra. But the liability is apportioned
among A and B by the ratio of their respective proportions of negligence to the total
causal negligence of the defendants against whom recovery is allowed. A is 25% negligent,
and B is 65% negligent. Total causal negligence of the defendants against whom re-
covery is allowed is 90%. C's judgment against A = $5,400 x 25/90 = $1,512. C's judg-
ment against B = $5,400 x 65/90 = $3,888.
23. In a pattern 2 jurisdiction where B is impecunious, the rationale of forcing
defendant A rather than claimant C to bear the loss is not to punish A for his greater
fault. The rationale is more pragmatic: A's liability loss is a readily insurable loss which
can and should be transferred to the party more capable of bearing it through liability
insurance. The same rationale applies in a pattern 1 jurisdiction when 'C is held jointly
liable with B for A's injuries and A is held jointly liable with B for C's injuries.
24. Mississippi, Rhode Island, New York, and Washington have adopted pure com-
parative negligence legislatively. See note 1 supra. Alaska, California, and Florida have
adopted pure comparative negligence judicially. See note 2 and accompanying text
supra.
25. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973). The court stated:
This rule should not be construed so as to entitle a person to recover for
damage in a case where the proof shows that the defendant could not by the
exercise of due care have prevented the injury, or where the defendant's
negligence was not a legal cause of the damage. Stated differently, there can be
[5:66
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To illustrate the principle of pure comparative negligence, con-
sider the hypothetical postulated in Table 1. Table 5 shows judg-
ments which would be computed in a comparative negligence jurisdic-
tion.
TABLE 5
A is entitled to judgment for $11,2502s against B and C.27
B is entitled to judgment for $13,30028 against A and C.
C is entitled to judgment for $5,40029 against A and B.
Even though B was more negligent than either A or C (indeed, more
negligent than both combined), B is entitled, as are A and C, to collect
his damages reduced only by his percentage of negligence. Assuming
that the negligence of each party is a causal element of the injuries of
the others, each is liable jointly and severally for the damages he
caused.30 The percentage of negligence which the jury attributed to B
is not relevant to the degree of his liability to another party, but is
employed for the express purpose of computing B's self-responsibility
discount. Thus, if B were the only party to have suffered compensable
loss, the relative degrees of fault of A and C would not be relevant for
the purpose of determining liability to B.
no apportionment of negligence where the negligence of the defendant is not
directly a legal cause of the result complained of by the plaintiff. A plaintiff
is barred from recovering damages for loss or injury caused by the negligence
of another only when the plaintiff's negligence is the sole legal cause of the
damage, or the negligence of the plaintiff and some person or persons other
than the defendant or defendants was the sole legal cause of the damage.
26. $15,000 - (25% x $15,000) = $11,250.
27. Assume that the concept of joint and several liability has not been abandoned.
28. $38,000 - (65% x $38,000) = $13,300.
29. $6,000 - (10% x $6,000) = $5,400.
30. Unlike the three-party hypothetical, Hoffman was a two-party action. The
Hoffman court concluded that the negligence of the two parties was a reciprocal
such that a reduction of the damages of one effected a transference of the total amount
of damages caused by the other. Unfortunately, the concept does not readily transfer
to the three-party action in which all of the parties have been causally negligent and
in which all of the parties have suffered damage. A more reasonable conclusion, in
light of the equitable foundation of the doctrine, is that pure comparative negligence
consists of two elements: a fault component which is satisfied when the parties'
damages are reduced by the self-responsibility discounts; and a no-fault aspect which
acknowledges the fortuity with which the quantum of damages is suffered. The no-
fault component was influential in the Hoffman court's decision to abandon contributory
negligence. The court stated: "The rule of contributory negligence is a harsh one
which either places the burden of a loss for which two are responsible upon only one
party or relegates to Lady Luck the determination of the damages for which each of
two negligent parties will be liable." 280 So. 2d at 437. For a general discussion of this
aspect of pure comparative negligence, see George & Walkowiak, Blame and Repara-
tion in Pure Comparative Negligence: The Multi-Party Action, 8 Sw. U.L. Rav. 1 (1976).
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The rationale for this principle was illustrated in Gutierrez v.
Murdock,31 a two-party action. In Gutierrez, the defendant crossed
the center line of a highway and collided with the plaintiff's automobile.
The defendant explained that he was acting defensively in order to
avoid a collision with an unknown, reckless third party. Contrary to
the principle of pure comparative negligence, the trial court never
instructed the jury to compute the plaintiff's proportion of negligence.
Rather, the trial court instructed the jury to compute the plaintiff's
recovery by multiplying his total damages by the percentage of the
defendant's negligence.3 2 On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal
reversed, declaring the jury instructions to be erroneous.3 3 Following
the Hoffman principle, the Gutierrez court held that "in order to
properly determine the award of damages, the jury must first determine
both the negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant as related to
each other."- The trial court's instructions would have placed the
burden of the unknown tortfeasor's negligence on the plaintiff since
the jury could easily have apportioned the total negligence between
the plaintiff, the defendant, and the mysterious stranger. A verdict
reflecting only the defendant's percentage of negligence would reduce
the plaintiff's damages, not only by his own self-responsibility discount
(if any), but also by the proportion of the unknown tortfeasor's
negligence. The effect of the district court's decision in Gutierrez
was to shift the percentage of negligence attributed to the mysterious
stranger from the plaintiff to the defendant. Thus, one of the basic
tenets of tort law was satisfied.3 5
31. 300 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
32. Id. at 690.
33. Id. at 691.
34. Id. See also Model v. Rabinowitz, 313 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
cert. denied, 327 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1976). In Model, the court stated: "[I]t is improper in
comparative negligence situations for the jury to apportion negligence either to joint
tortfeasors; or 'phantom' tortfeasors who are not before the court; or even to the Supreme
Being." 313 So. 2d 59, 60 n.1.
35. This basic tenet of tort law is that, in the absence of a better rationale, losses
should be transferred from a poor loss distributor to a good loss distributor. When the
decision must be made whether to force the plaintiff to bear the loss or shift the loss
to a defendant who has greater access to liability insurance, it is axiomatic that the
loss should be shifted since liability insurance is the better loss distributor. Liability
insurance purports to transfer losses equitably to all who partake in the "risk-
creating activity." One proponent of this philosophy states:
I think it highly desirable to provide for the shifting of tort damage-the victims
of which are statistically ubiquitous but personally unidentifiable in advance-
from the shoulders of those who are hurt to all of society, or to all who partake
in the risk-creating activity producing the harm.
Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1176
(1941).
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Returning to the hypothetical, recall that each party has one
favorable judgment, yet remains potentially liable on two unfavorable
judgments. A has a favorable judgment of $11,250, and is potentially
liable on two unfavorable judgments totaling $18,700;"6 B has a favor-
able judgment for $13,300, and is potentially liable on two unfavorable
judgments totaling $16,650;3 7 C has a favorable judgment for $5,400,
and is potentially liable on two unfavorable judgments totaling
$24,550. s Thus, each has a potential liability exceeding his potential
recovery.39 But the pattern of liability does not reflect the pattern of
probable payments.
As has always been the rule, each party is entitled to only one
satisfaction of his judgment. Satisfaction of a joint and several liability
by one tortfeasor relieves the other joint tortfeasor of all liability.40
The possible permutations in a multiple party action are numerous.
One example will serve to illustrate some inherent problems of apply-
ing pure comparative negligence in the absence of a system of total
loss distribution.41 Suppose that B and C proceed against A, and that
36. $13,300 + $5,400 = $18,700.
37. $11,250 + $5,400 = $16,650.
38. $11,250 + $13,300 = $24,550.
39. This result will not occur if a party's net total liabilities do not exceed his
net total compensable damage. Such a situation arises (1) where a party suffers much
greater injury than the other parties, and/or (2) where a party is fortunate enough
not to severely injure someone else. Such possibilities do exist; it is unrealistic to
accept a concept of loss allocation which places so much emphasis on chance.
It is equally unrealistic to assume that the relevance of these various loss possibilities
will be lost upon A's, B's, or C's loan officers, accountants, or insurance carriers. Each
of the loss variations (including those shown in note 41 and accompanying text infra)
represents a possible result of a multi-party accident under pure comparative negligence
where there is no system of post-verdict loss distribution other than the traditional
concept of joint and several liability.
40. This rule applies only in the absence of a right to contribution.
41. Other examples follow:
(1) Both B and C proceed against A, who satisfies both judgments by paying
$18,700 ($13,300 + $5,400). A then proceeds against B; B pays $11,250 to A. The net
results follow: A loses $7,450 ($18,700 - $11,250); B gains $2,050 ($13,300 - $11,250);
C gains $5,400.
(2) A and C proceed against B, who satisfies their judgments by paying them
$16,650 ($11,250 + $5,400). B proceeds against A, who pays B $13,300. The net results
follow: A loses $2,050 ($13,300 - $11,250); B loses $3,350 ($16,650 - $13,300); C gains
$5,400.
(3) A and C proceed against B, who satisfies their judgments by paying them
$16,650. B then proceeds against C, who pays B $13,300. The net results follow: A gains
$11,250; B loses $3,350; C loses $7,900 ($13,300 - $5,400).
(4) A and B proceed against C, who satisfies their judgments by paying them
$24,550 ($13,300 + $11,250). C then proceeds against A, who pays C $5,400. The net
results follow: A gains $5,850 ($11,250 - $5,400); B gains $13,300; C loses $19,150
($24,550 - $5,400).
(5) A and B proceed against C, who satisfies their judgments by paying them
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A satisfied their respective judgments by paying $13,300 to B and
$5,400 to C. A then has the option of proceeding against either B or
C to recover his own judgment of $11,250. Suppose A proceeds against
C. C, who received $5,400 from A, now must pay $11,250 to A. Absent
a rule permitting contribution among tortfeasors, and absent the
possibility that A or C could secure indemnity, application of pure
comparative negligence yields the following results: A loses $7,450;42
B gains $13,300; and C loses $5,850.4 Because all parties were negligent,
no party is entitled to recover his full damages suffered. But note, too,
that only one party receives his full compensable damages, while two
parties never recover their full compensable damages.
When pure comparative negligence is applied in a multiple party
action, such undesirable results are avoided only through a viable
pattern of post-judgment loss distribution. This article undertakes an
analysis of the Florida approach to post-verdict loss distribution. Two
methods have been employed to accomplish loss distribution of tort
injuries: set-off and contribution.
II. SET-OFF
Under pure comparative negligence, the degrees of causal
negligence attributed to the claimant interact with the total amount
of damages which he has proven to establish the amount of compensa-
tion to which he is entitled. The pure comparative negligence action
may, therefore, be logically thought of as containing three distinguish-
able elements. The claimant must first prove the liability of the person
from whom he is seeking compensation for his injuries. He must
then prove his damages-the amount of money which will compensate
him for all of the legally compensable injuries he has suffered as a
result of the tortfeasor's liability. Finally, the percentage of the
claimant's culpability is determined. The total dollar amount of the
damages suffered by the claimant is reduced by the percentage of his
own culpability. The claimant receives judgment for the dollar amount
of damages thus reduced. Under pure comparative negligence the
claimant should be entitled to these damages without subjecting them
to further reduction. Application of a legal doctrine such as set-off
can effect an unnecessary further reduction of personally innocent
damages.
$24,550. C then proceeds against B, who pays C $5,400. The net results follow: A gains
$11,250; B gains $7,900 ($13,300 - $5,400); C loses $19,150.
42. ($13,300 + $5,400) - $11,250 = $7,450.
43. $11,250 - $5,400 = $5,850.
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The doctrine of set-off (the reduction of a claimant's recovery by
subtracting from that recovery the amount of any outstanding liability
the claimant owes to the judgment debtor) has a long history in the
law of contract litigation. 44 The essential difference between the purpose
of damages in contract litigation and the purpose of compensatory
damages in tort litigation, however, necessitates a different approach
to the question of whether damages should be set off in a tort action
brought in a jurisdiction applying pure comparative negligence.45 A
detailed comparison of the difference between the nature of damages
in these two types of civil actions requires a more detailed analysis
than space permits. Nevertheless, the primary distinctions between
the purposes of such damages can be stated in an abbreviated form.
Damages in a contract action represent an attempt to place the
injured party in the same financial situation that he would have been
had the contract been performed. Tort damages are awarded to com-
pensate the claimant for the physical or emotional injury suffered as the
result of a tortfeasor's conduct; that is, to restore him as nearly as
possible to his condition before the tort. Therefore, in the contract
action the agreement forms the basis for determining the amount of
damages to be awarded to the claimant. A tort claimant, however,
receives as damages a dollar award which represents not only out-of-
pocket expense, but also an attempt to quantify the physical and
emotional trauma suffered as a result of the physical injury caused.
The unsuccessful contract claimant may have lost the benefit of a
good bargain; the unsuccessful tort claimant may have lost an arm,
a leg, or a loved one.
The Rhode Island legislature apparently considered the dichoto-
mous nature of damages when, adopting the doctrine of pure compara-
tive negligence, it expressly prohibited set-off.46 The Alaska and Cali-
fornia Supreme Courts made no reference to set-off in their land-
mark decisions adopting pure comparative negligence. 47 The Supreme
Court of Florida in Hoffman, however, adopted a rule providing for
set-off4 -with unfortunate and probably unintended results, especially
44. For a brief summary of the history of set-off, see F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §
10.14 at 473-74 (1965).
45. Recall that it is possible for a party to be liable to and from another only
when pure comparative negligence or pattern 1 of modified comparative negligence are
applicable.
46. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-20-4.1 (Supp. 1975).
47. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975); Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532
P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
48. The Hoffman court stated:
In the usual situation where the negligence of the plaintiff is at issue, as
well as that of the defendant, there will undoubtedly be a counterclaim filed. ...
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in the multi-party action. 9
The Hoffman court recognized that pure comparative negligence
could result in a seriously injured but more negligent party receiving
the only affirmative judgment.50 This result is inherent in the adoption
of pure comparative negligence, for a party is entitled to the full
amount of his damages reduced only by his self-responsibility discount.
The Florida court, however, required that in the two-party negligence
action where both parties receive an award of damages, the verdicts
be set off against each other and one affirmative judgment entered.51
The bankruptcy of this approach in tort litigation has already
been stated. When, however, the presence of liability insurance is
acknowledged, the effect of set-off seems apparent. It does not result
in the reduction of a personal liability on behalf of the claimant-
tortfeasor; rather, it presents a further litigation issue on behalf of
the liability insurance carrier seeking to reduce its judgment liability.52
Prior to Hoffman, the traditional reluctance of the courts to con-
sider the effect of the presence of liability insurance had already been
overcome in Florida.53 This earlier pragmatism coupled with the
This could result in two verdicts-one for plaintiff and one for cross-plaintiff.
In such event the Court should enter one judgment in favor of the party
receiving the larger verdict, the amount of which should be the difference between
the two verdicts. This is in keeping with the long recognized principles of "set-
off" in contract litigation.
280 So. 2d at 439.
49. Damages in contract litigation essentially derive directly from the enterprise or
person suing or being sued. Thus, the purpose of set-off is one of efficiency. It prevents
unnecessary and unwarranted exchanges of money. See Stuyvesant Insurance Co. v.
Bournazian, 342 So. 2d 471, Appendix B at p. 124 infra (Fla. 1977). Tort liability,
however, is frequently borne by an enterprise which is a preferable loss distributor-
the insurance carrier. Therefore, the societal effect of setting off tort losses is that
losses are borne by the claimant rather than allocated as enterprise costs to a better
loss distributor. Given the no-fault aspect of damages (which have been reduced by an
individual's self-responsibility discount), these losses should be shifted to the better
loss distributor-the liability insurance carrier. Cf. id. at 473-74, Appendix B at p. 126
infra (discussion of impact of set-off on insurance carrier liability). See also note 35
supra.
50. The court stated:
[L]et us assume that a plaintiff is 80 per cent responsible for an automobile
accident and suffers $20,000 in damages, and that the defendant-20 per cent
responsible-fortunately suffers no damages. . . . If a jury found that this de-
fendant had been negligent and that his negligence, in relation to that of the
plaintiff, was 20 per cent responsible for causing the accident then he should
pay 20 per cent of the total damages, regardless of the fact that he has been
fortunate enough to not be damaged personally.
280 So. 2d at 439.
51. Id. See note 48 supra.
52. See note 54 and accompanying text infra.
53. In Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla, 1969), the Supreme Court of
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Hoffman court's radical, almost legislative, adoption of pure com-
parative negligence, supplied the court with a sufficient framework to
analyze the effects of set-off upon a party represented by a liability
insurer. The failure of the court to make this analysis resulted in
the decision to apply set-off. Thus, the Hoffman court disregarded
the superiority of loss spreading of innocent damages through liability
insurance and inadvertently created a scheme in which transactional
costs are increased to the benefit, in most cases, of only the liability
insurance carrier, the most efficient loss distributor.
When set-off is applied as under Hoffman, the liability insurance
carrier of the party from whom damages are sought is placed in the
position of affirmatively seeking compensation for damages caused to
its insured in order to apply those damages as a credit against its own
ultimate liability.- Thus, the judgment of a party whose damages
have already been reduced by his self-responsibility discount is further
reduced by the amount of compensable damages (total damages suffered
reduced by the self-responsibility discount) of the party from whom he
seeks compensation.55 The party who has suffered the greatest amount
Florida concluded that a direct cause of action inured to an injured party against
a tortfeasor's liability insurer since the injured party was a third party beneficiary
of the contract between the tortfeasor and the liability insurer.
54. See Acts of 1955 Arkansas General Assembly, Act 191, Comparative Negligence,
9 ARK. L. REV. 357 (1955). The analysis states:
[I]f there is no set-off, the insurer, who usually has charge of the defense by
terms of the policy, will not be so careful to prove high damages and low negligence
on the part of his assured, since such proof will not ultimately benefit the in-
surance carrier. If set-off is allowed in all cases, however, the insurance company
has a direct interest in giving the insured the benefit of all its energy to show
his damages in order to net the plaintiff a smaller recovery if possible.
Id. at 383. Naturally, if the insurance company is providing first-person insurance, its
opportunity of collecting under a subrogation clause is reduced. It has been suggested
that this result is desirable since subrogation encourages insurance companies to flock
to the courts, increasing litigation costs and resulting only in the transference of the
same money. Pitkin, The Dilemmas of Auto Insurance, THE AMERICAN LEGION MAGAZINE
8, 48 (April 1969).
55. See note 48 supra. Assume that A and B are involved in an accident which
each suffers damages due to the combined negligence of both. The following verdicts
are returned:
Self
Responsibility Total
Party Discount Damages
A 20% $16,000
B 80% $20,000
The judge would reduce each party's total damages by the percentage of his self-
responsibility discount: A's innocent damages would be $12,800 [$16,000 - (20% x
$16,000)]; B's innocent damages would be $4,000 [$20,000 - (80% x $20,000)]. The
judge would then enter an $8,800 judgment for A ($12,800 - $4,000).
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of innocent damage after reduction by the self-responsibility discount
is the only party entitled to an affirmative judgment. This could quite
naturally result in a more culpable party (larger self-responsibility
discount) with greater damages receiving the only affirmative judg-
ment.56
The doctrine of set-off, therefore, does not give the insured party
benefits proportional to the doctrine's disadvantages. The insured
individual suffering innocent damages in an amount less than the
party from whom he seeks compensation totally loses the right to
collect any amount of those damages. 57 Only if the insured individual
56. 280 So. 2d at 439. For example, assume that A and B are involved in an
accident in which each suffers damages due to the combined negligence of both. The
following verdicts are returned:
Self
Responsibility Total
Party Discount Damages
A 20% $ 5,000
B 80% $50,000
The judge would reduce each party's total damages by the percentage of his self-
responsibility discount: A's innocent damages would be $4,000 [$5,000 - (20% x $5,000)];
B's innocent damages would be $10,000 [$50,000 - (80% x $50,000)]. Application of
set-off would result in a $6,000 (the difference between A's and B's innocent damages)
judgment for B. Thus, B would receive the only affirmative judgment even though the
jury found B more negligent than A.
In the absence of set-off, each party would be entitled to his damages reduced by
his self-responsibility discount.
Any criticism of the right to collect from someone less negligent is a criticism of
pure comparative negligence and is beyond the scope of this article. Since the purpose
of this article is to analyze methods of loss allocation under pure comparative negligence,
the validity of the doctrine itself is assumed.
57. In the absence of set-off, uninsured motorists coverage provides an insured
claimant compensation for his innocent damages even though the party from whom
he seeks these damages is uninsured. A typical uninsured motorists coverage clause
provides:
The company will pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative
shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of
an uninsured highway vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured,
caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such
uninsured highway vehicle; provided, for the purposes of this coverage, determina-
tion as to whether the insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover
such damages, and if so the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between.
the insured or such representative and the company or, if they fail to agree,
by arbitration.
No judgment against any person or organization alleged to be legally responsible
for the bodily injury shall be conclusive, as between the insured and the company,
of the issues of liability of such person or organization or of the amount of
damages to which the insured is legally entitled unless such judgment is entered
pursuant to an action prosecuted by the insured with the written consent of
the company.
[5:66
PURE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
is found liable for an amount exceeding the amount of his liability
insurance does he directly feel the effects of the doctrine of set-off.
But even in that case, the direct effect has been to force him to bear
the financial burden of his own personally innocent losses in exchange
for a reduction in total liability. The benefits to the insured are
evanescent. 5
If the doctrine of set-off is not applied, each party will be entitled
to his own personally innocent damages from the party liable for
those damages. Each party will receive compensation for those damages
reduced only by his own self-responsibility discount. In this instance,
therefore, each party will receive more substantial benefits than the
doctrine of set-off grants him since the right to seek compensation
for injuries innocent of his own fault is not lost.
Although the Hoffman court may have supposed that the expected
efficiency of set-off would provide benefits to uninsured parties, judicial
acknowledgment of the existence and social desirability of insurance
as a loss allocation system should force a reexamination of the initial
acceptance of the doctrine of set-off.
Once primary cost 59 reduction has been effected through applica-
tion of the self-responsibility discount factors, the strictures of the
fault system have been satisfied 6° and the injured claimant will expect
Coverage U-Uninsured Motorists, 1966 Standard Form, The Standard Uninsured
Motorist Endorsements, reprinted in A. WIDiSS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTOIuST
COVERAGE 291 app. A (1969). See FLA. STAT. § 627.727 (1975).
This form of coverage illustrates the essential issue: whether the injured individual
should be required to exchange his right to collect for innocent injuries (a right which
he would have but for application of set-off) for a reduction of judgment liability which
inures only to the benefit of his insurance carrier.
58. Suppose an insured suffers $10,000 damages for his innocent injuries. Suppose
further that his liability for other parties' injuries exceeds his liability coverage by
$10,000. Whether the insured receives $10,000 compensation for his injuries via an
affirmative judgment (set-off not applied) or has his judgment liability reduced by
$10,000 (application of set-off) and receives no compensation for his own injuries, the
net dollar effect to him is the same. But the vast majority of cases will not involve
suits in excess of insurance coverage. Even in such cases, the social utility of effecting
a reduction in innocent damages is questionable. Sound policy requires transference of
losses to the more efficient loss distributor.
59. "Primary costs" are damages caused by injuries which the fault system is
intended to deter. It is a truism that primary costs occur only where fault-related
injuries are suffered. The injuries, whether fault-related or non-fault-related, are just
as real, and a means of compensation would be necessary. Innocent injuries, however,
do not require proceedings for fault determination and the consequent administration
of a system of secondary loss distribution. More efficient and, perhaps, more equitable
methods of loss allocation would be fashioned if the determination of fault were not
deemed essential for the determination of compensation.
60. One purpose of a fault system is to deter certain conduct by imposing civil
liability for injuries caused by that conduct. Under pure comparative negligence, the
deterrent features of the fault system are exhausted once fault is determined, the
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compensation for his injuries. It will come as small consolation that
the liability insurance for which he has been paying to protect
himself against loss does not, in fact, protect him-except to the extent
that his own innocent losses do not exceed those of the opposing party.
While arguments will be marshalled that insurance premiums have
been reduced through the application of set-off, the prior record of
liability insurance, at least in the automobile insurance area, will
not bear this out. This largest arena of liability coverage returns
less than forty-five percent of premium dollars to injured victims
while chewing up the rest in overhead and legal fees.61 An attempt to
reduce rather than increase litigable issues could be expected to lower
liability insurance premium costs; for as these issues proliferate, the
percentage of overhead and legal fees may be expected to take a larger
and larger share of the premium dollar. To the extent, therefore, that
set-off illustrates the deficiencies of the fault system as a basis for the
allocation of tort losses and fosters the trend toward nonfault alterna-
tives, it may indirectly achieve socially desirable goals.
The philosophical and practical problems which set-off presents
to efficient loss allocation in the two-party action are magnified in
the multi-party action. In Stuyvesant Insurance Co. v. Bournazian ,62
the Florida appellate courts had their first encounter with the prob-
lems necessarily inherent in requiring set-off in the multiple party
negligence action under pure comparative negligence. The action was
commenced by Royce Bournazian for an automobile accident which
occurred between an automobile owned and driven by him and a
vehicle owned by Paul Riley63 and driven by his wife, Betty Riley.
self-responsibility discount factor is applied, and the claimant is determined to be
entitled to receive damages. Fault deterrence does not justify further reduction of
the claimant's damages.
61. See R. KEETON, COMPENSATION SYSTEMS: THE SEARCH FOR A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
TO NEGLIGENCE LAW 32-33 (1969). Loss spreading through liability insurance is socially
desirable since it permits interpersonal allocation of secondary tort costs, such as
expenses of litigation, to all persons involved in an injury causing enterprise. Liability
insurance is preferred over the alternative of non-distribution which requires that the
injured party bear insurable costs. But even liability insurance is not the most socially
desirable method of loss distribution. The optimum method would be a pure no-fault,
first-party insurance system. See generally, George & Walkowiak, Blame and Reparation
in Pure Comparative Negligence: The Multi-Party Action, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 1 (1976).
62. 303 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), rev'd, No. 46,573 (Fla. Mar. 10,
1976) [hereinafter cited as Bournazian original opinion] (reprinted in Appendix A of
this article; see pp. 121-24 infra), withdrawn and superseded by 342 So. 2d 471 (Fla.
1977 [hereinafter cited as Bournazian opinion on rehearing] (reprinted in Appendix
B of this article; see pp. 124-27 infra) (af'g 2d Dist. Ct. App.).
63. Under Florida law, an automobile is classified as a dangerous instrumentality.
The practical result of this rule is to impose vicarious liability upon the owner of a
vehicle for personal injuries to another caused by the consensual operation of the
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Royce sued both Rileys and joined their liability insurer, 4 Stuyvesant
Insurance Company. Royce's wife, Linda Bournazian, filed a derivative
claim against both Rileys and their insurance carrier as a result of
the injuries suffered by her husband. Betty counterclaimed against
Royce and his liability carrier, Allstate Insurance Company, for her
injuries; and Paul filed a derivative claim against Royce and Allstate
for the injuries suffered by Betty. The jury was given the case and
instructed to apply the recently adopted pure comparative negligence
rule. Separate verdicts were rendered for each party. After deductions
for the parties' self-responsibility discounts, the verdicts were further
reduced to the amounts listed in Table 6.
TABLE 6
Verdict for Royce for $8500 against Betty, Paul, and Stuyvesant.
Verdict for Linda for $1500 against Betty, Paul, and Stuyvesant.
Verdict for Paul for $1000 against Royce and Allstate.
Verdict for Betty for $19,000 against Royce and Allstate.
The trial court, in an attempt to apply the set-off language of Hoffman,
mistakenly aggregated the Bournazian verdicts and subtracted them
from the larger Riley verdicts. The trial court then awarded judg-
ment of $10,000 to the Rileys.6 5 On appeal, the trial court's applica-
tion of set-off was reversed.
The Second District Court of Appeal correctly recognized that
$30,000 of innocent damages had been suffered by the parties and that
applying set-off as the trial court had done resulted in an insurance
company windfall at the expense of the injured parties. As the court
noted,
[h]ad the Bournazians' claims been prosecuted in one suit and the
Rileys' claims in another, both insurance carriers would have been
liable for the total of the resulting verdicts. By reason of the claims
vehicle. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920); Jordan v. Kelson,
299 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974). See also note 82 infra.
64. Of the jurisdictions which have adopted pure comparative negligence by court
rule, only Florida permits direct actions against liability insurance carriers. See Shingle-
ton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969), discussed in note 53 supra.
65. The trial court added Royce's verdict for $8,500 and Linda's verdict of $1,500
and concluded that the Bournazians were entitled to a total of $10,000. The trial court
then added Paul's $1,000 verdict to Betty's $19,000 verdict and concluded that the
Rileys were entitled to a total of $20,000. The court subtracted the cumulative Bournazian
award from the cumulative Riley award and entered judgment for the Rileys in the
amount of $10,000. Bournazian opinion on rehearing, 342 So. 2d at 472, Appendix B at
125 infra.
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being tried together, Stuyvesant was relieved from liability largely
because of the serious nature of its insured's injuries and Allstate's
liability was reduced for the same reason. Such a result flies in the
face of the social desirability of providing automobile accident
victims in Florida with reasonable access to liability insurance
benefits. 66
Nevertheless, bound by the Hoffman opinion, the Second District
Court of Appeal construed the rule of set-off to apply to reciprocal
jury verdicts involving the same parties. It thus concluded that Hofyman
required alternative judgments as set out in Table 7.6
TABLE 7
Royce's verdict of $ 8,500
less Paul's verdict of 1,000
Paul owes Royce $ 7,500
Royce's verdict of $ 8,500
less Betty's verdict of 19,000
Royce owes Betty $10,500
Royce's verdict of $ 8,500
less Stuyvesant's verdict of 0
Stuyvesant owes Royce $ 8,500
Paul's verdict of $ 1,000
less Allstate's verdict of 0
Allstate owes Paul $ 1,000
Betty's verdict of $19,000
less Allstate's verdict of 0
Allstate owes Betty $19,000
The Second District concluded that this application of the rule
of set-off was the only way to effect the intent of pure comparative
negligence and the supreme court's set-off rule. 8 Naturally, each party
was entitled to execute judgment but once. Thus, if Royce collected
his judgment from Stuyvesant, then Betty or Paul could collect
their judgments from Royce. Royce's liability insurance company
would, of course, then be forced to pay the full total of Royce's
liability to Betty and Paul. Only if one party proceeded against another
party who had an affirmative judgment against it would the net
66. 303 So. 2d at 73 (footnote omitted).
67. See id.
68. Id.
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compensable damages not be paid. Insurance companies would, of
course, be forced to pay the full amount of the net compensable
losses. Surely, this was an intended goal of the Florida Supreme Court
when it adopted pure comparative negligence. The premium paid to
a liability insurance company represents full consideration for the
risks of liability. The Second District Court's application of the set-
off doctrine prevents a windfall to the liability insurer at the expense of
injured parties.69 Thus, explaining its application of set-off, the court
stated:
This result does not violate the concept that the liability of the
insured is a condition precedent to the liability of his insurer. The
liability of the insureds as reflected by the verdicts will be taken
into account in the rendition of the judgments. For example, the
liability of Paul to Royce established in this case was $8,500, which
is exactly the amount that Paul's insurer will be obligated to pay.
Royce's judgment against Paul will be reduced to $7,500 only
because Royce had a corresponding liability of $1,000 to Paul.
The fact that there were off-sets among the parties does not diminish
the responsibility of the liability insurance carriers.70
Despite the desirable result reached by the Second District Court
of Appeal, its decision was quashed by the Florida Supreme Court's
first opinion in Bournazian.71 In an opinion which offered more con-
fusion than enlightenment, the supreme court applied set-off as shown
in Table 8.72
TABLE 8
(1) Betty's verdict of $19,000
less Royce's verdict of 8,500
Royce owes Betty $10,500
(2) Paul's verdict of $ 1,000
less Royce's verdict of 0
Royce owes Paul $ 1,000'.
69. The Supreme Court of Florida, on rehearing Bournazian, implicitly recognized
that insurance premiums represent the costs of shared liability among policyholders
exclusive of reduction by the policyholders' own damages. 342 So. 2d at 473-74, Appendix
B at p. 127 infra. Any other interpretation would allow allocation of the risk to a
poor loss distributor.
70. 303 So. 2d at 73.
71. Bournazian original opinion, Appendix A at 121 infra.
72. See Bournazian opinion on rehearing, 342 So. 2d at 472-73, Appendix B at 125
infra.
73. The court concluded that Royce "spent" his $8,500 verdict when it was dis-
charged by his and Betty's offsetting judgments. Id.
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(3) Paul and Betty owe Linda $ 1,500 4
The court noted that "[t]he set-off principle announced [in Hoffman]
for comparative negligence cases in Florida does not easily translate
to cases which involve multiple parties and their insurers. '"75 But
then the court mechanically applied the derivative liability rule,""
stating that payment of the net liabilities would represent accurate and
full reflection of the jury verdicts. 7 7
Justice Adkins, the author of the majority opinion in Hoffman,
dissented; he criticized the Bournazian majority for misapplying
Hoffman's expression of the set-off rule:
The majority's decision in the case at bar distributing the loss from
the shoulders of the parties' liability insurance carriers to the
injured parties does not create a more socially desirable method
of loss distribution.
It was entirely proper that the respective verdicts for the parties
be set off. However, set-offs among the parties should not diminish
the responsibility of the liability insurance carriers.78
74. There was no offsetting liability by Linda to Paul and Betty. Id.; Bournazian
original opinion at 4, Appendix A at 122 infra.
75. Bournazian original opinion at 2, Appendix A at 121 infra.
76. The court stated: "Our consideration of this problem begins with a recognition
of the legal principle that the liability of the insurers in this case is derivative only,
representing a responsibility to pay an amount first determined to be owed by another."
Id. at 3, Appendix A at 121 infra.
77. Id. at 4, Appendix A at 122 infra. But the cash payments will not fully and
accurately reflect the jury verdicts. See note 78 and accompanying text infra. Perhaps
the court's statement could be defended if the jury were informed of the effect in
advance. But that is not the case. And there is substantial authority against informing
the jury of the legal effects of its answers to special interrogatories. See Annot., 90
A.L.R.2d 1040 (1963). But see Smith, Comparative Negligence Problems with the Special
Verdict: Informing the Jury of the Legal Effects of Their Answers, 10 LAND AND
WATER L. REV. 199 (1975). See also Cadena, Comparative Negligence and the Special
Verdict, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 688 (1974).
78. Bournazian original opinion at 7, Appendix A at 123 infra (Adkins, J., dissent-
ing). Even the majority recognized that "the dollar effect of these transfers [see Table 8
supra] requires the insurance carriers to pay only $13,000 in claims." Id. at 4, Appendix
A at 122 infra (footnote omitted). The majority further noted that "under the district
court's view [the insurance carriers] would pay out $30,000." Id. at 4 n.5, Appendix A
at 122 n.5 infra. Thus, the net effect of the appeal in Bournazian was to reap a $17,000
benefit for the insurance companies at the expense of the injured individuals involved.
The supreme court's original Bournazian decision required that Stuyvesant (through
its insureds, Paul and Betty Riley) pay $1,500 to Linda Bournazian, and that Allstate
(through its insured, Royce Bournazian) pay $10,500 to Betty Riley and $1,000 to
Paul Riley.
This "net effect" result of the Bournazian original opinion would cause considerable
concern to an attorney who represents parties in the same position as the Bournazians
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Betty Riley would likewise disagree that the majority's result
accurately and fully reflected the jury verdicts; Betty arbitrarily bore
the entire brunt of the $8,500 judgment awarded Royce Bournazian
against Betty, Paul, and Stuyvesant. If Royce's judgment were set
off against Paul's judgment, then Paul would owe Royce $7,500;
Betty would be entitled to her full judgment of $19,000 from Royce,
as awarded by the jury.79 Thus, the Bournazian decision effected a
dramatic change in the manner of handling judgments. The rule
previously applied in Florida permitted a judgment creditor to execute
his judgment against joint tortfeasors jointly and severally. The
Bournazian decision took that option from the judgment creditor
and placed it with the court.
The Bournazian court at least should have considered the alterna-
tive set out in Table 9.
and their liability insurer or the Rileys and their liability insurer. See generally R.
KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw § 7.7(a) (1971); Comment, The Insurer's Duty
to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 734 (1966). Indeed,
there is some question as to whether an attorney may ethically represent two such
parties in that situation. THE FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR
5-105(B), 32 FLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1976-77) provides: "A lawyer shall not continue
multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf
of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another
client, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C)."
Any attorney attempting to represent both insureds and their insurance companies
in a Bournazian.type situation would inevitably have such a prohibited conflict. At the
minimum, an attorney would have to fully and accurately disclose such a conflict:
In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent
multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest
of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the
possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent pro-
fessional judgment on behalf of each.
Tim FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C), 32 FLA. STAT.
ANN. (Supp. 1976-77).
Consider one final comment regarding the "net effect" of the supreme court's
original Bournazian decision. The insurance industry does not have an inherent economic
interest in reducing the aggregate amount of losses transferred from victims to others.
Loss transference is the raison d'etre of the industry. George & Walkowiak, Blame and
Reparation in Pure Comparative Negligence: The Multi-Party Action, 8 Sw. U.L. REV.
1, 28 n.77 (1976). Reduction of transferred losses in the initial Bournazian manner,
therefore, represents a threat to business interests as well as to the humanitarian goals
of the pure comparative negligence doctrine. Perhaps, after all, the doctrine of com-
parative negligence will become fostered exclusively by lawyers for lawyers. See generally
Palmer, Let Us Be Frank About Comparative Negligence, 28 L.A.B.A. BULL. 37 (1952).
79. It should be emphasized that under no circumstances can Royce collect the
$7,500 in cash and also use that liability to offset Betty's judgment. Also, as the
Supreme Court of Florida noted, the amounts received by each spouse will be treated
as the spouse's separate property. Bournazian original opinion at 4 n.4, Appendix A at
122 n.4 infra. See FLA. STAT. § 708.08(1) (1975).
1977]
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
TABLE 9
(1) Royce's verdict of $ 8,500
less Paul's verdict of 1,000
Betty and Paul owe Royce $ 7,500
Betty's verdict of $19,000
less Royce's remaining verdict of 7,500
Royce owes Betty $11,500
(2) Betty and Paul owe Royce $ 1,500
Those results effect the full compensation awarded Betty by the jury;
Betty would be entitled to benefit by the amount paid to Royce
in cash or via set-off. This is not to suggest that the Table 9 applica-
tion of set-off should have been adopted instead of the method adopted
by the Bournazian court. But the Table 9 application is of analytical
interest in that it appears to be equally acceptable. In the absence
of further guidance, the problem of mechanistic alternatives could
have been expected to proliferate.
Fortunately, the confusion generated by Bournazian was short-
lived in Florida. On rehearing, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed
the decision of the district court of appeal; the supreme court's original
opinion was withdrawn. 80 The court thus reversed its previous position
stating:
We conclude ... that the concept of "set-off" (more properly "re-
coupment") as announced in Hoffman applies only between un-
insured parties to a negligence action, or to insured parties to the
extent that insurance does not cover their mutual liabilities. The
doctrine has no effect on the contractual obligations of liability
insurance carriers81
If application of the Hoffman set-off rules to the Bournazian facts
was difficult for the courts, application of set-off to the multiple-party
action would have proven even more difficult. Bournazian was es-
sentially a two-party action since there were only two active tort-
feasors: Royce (as evidenced by the fact that Linda was not even
sued) and Betty (although Paul was sued for vicarious liability under
Florida's interpretation of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine2).
80. Bournazian opinion on rehearing, 342 So. 2d at 474, Appendix B at 127 infra.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Morse Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Lewis, 161 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1964) (recognizing general rule but applying an exception); Hutchins v. Frank
E. Campbell, Inc., 123 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960). See note 63 supra.
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The solutions offered by the original Bournazian decision would be-
come even more bizarre in the typical three-party action.
With respect to the hypothetical three-party action postulated in
Tables 183 and 5,84 liability might be assessed in any of the three
ways shown in Table 10 if set-off is applied.
TABLE 1085
Variation I (A v. B set-off)
B's verdict of $13,300
less A's verdict of 11,250
B is entitled to $ 2,050
C's verdict of $ 5,400
less B's unsatisfied 2,050
A or B pay C $3,350
Net cash exchange $ 3,350
83. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
84. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
85. There is an alternative pattern to each of the three variations shown in
Table 10:
Variation la (A v. B set-off)
B's verdict of $13,300
less A's verdict of 11,250
A pays B $ 2,050
C is allowed to collect his full $5,400 from either A or B.
Net cash exchange $ 7,450
Variation 2a (A v. C set-off)
A's verdict of $11,250
less C's verdict of 5,400
C pays A $ 5,850
B is allowed to collect his full $13,300 from either A orC.
Net cash exchange $19,150
Variation 3a (B v. C set-off)
B's verdict of $13,300
less C's verdict of 5,400
C pays B $ 7,900
A is allowed to collect his full $11,250 from either B or C.
Net cash exchange $19,150
But there is no reason to believe that the Bournazian court, having initially decided
to apply the doctrine of set-off, would stop at having set off a common liability once
while permitting the co-tortfeasois to collect affirmatively. In other words, once a court
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Variation 2 (A v. C set-off)
A's verdict of $11,250
less C's verdict of 5,400
A is entitled to $ 5,850
B's verdict of $13,300
less A's unsatisfied 5,850
A or C pay B $ 7,450
Net cash exchange $ 7,450
Variation 3 (B v. C set-off)
B's verdict of $13,300
less C's verdict of 5,400
B is entitled to $ 7,900
A's verdict of $11,250
less B's unsatisfied 7,900
B or C pay A $ 3,350
Net cash exchange $ 3,350
The initial Bournazian decision would make any of the Table 10
variations acceptable if set-off applied, though none of them effect
the intent of a jury seeking to apply the Hoffman principle. And
the benefit (if any) to the liability insurers of A, B, or C is likewise
evanescent, for the insurance industry has no inherent economic in-
terest in discouraging effective loss transference.
In theory, the fault system seeks to deter socially undesirable con-
duct (1) by requiring the party at fault to compensate those injured
as a result of his conduct and (2) by preventing persons injured
through their own fault from collecting for those injuries. Thus, the
primary costs of accidents are reduced through the fault system by
discouraging certain conduct and by inducing the introduction of
safety devices to the extent that they cost less than the cost of damages
which they prevent.8 6 The doctrine of pure comparative negligence
decides to apply set-off, it will likely set off liabilities until there is nothing further
to set off.
86. For a well-articulated analysis of the economics of secondary loss distribution,
see Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs,
78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965); Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of
Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216 (1965); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribu
tion and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). This author is indebted to Professor
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represents a pattern in which civil liability is related to the goal of
accident prevention.
The doctrine attempts to reduce primary accident costs through
application of the fault principle. Once the determination of which
injuries are compensable has been made, however, the loss transference
costs of the fault system become a factor. The effect of the original
Bournazian set-off scheme would be to raise the costs of loss trans-
ference and, therefore, the cost of accidents. The amount of money
available for loss compensation would be decreased as more capital
was expended in loss avoidance. In this case, loss avoidance would
take the form of litigation necessary to prove an insured's innocent in-
juries. These innocent injuries would not be proved in order to pro-
vide compensation to the insured. They would be proved to provide
set-off for a liability carrier against other personally innocent injuries.
The reduction of accident costs should, however, include the
socially desirable result of interpersonal loss spreading through in-
surance, a concept implicitly recognized by the Bournazian decision
on rehearing. If the injured parties are required to bear the financial
burden of their own innocent losses through application of the
doctrine of set-off, a less socially desirable result is reached than
spreading these losses interpersonally or intertemporally. Set-off re-
quires the parties to personally bear the amount of their set-off
liability. Thus, if X's innocent damages are $50,000 and Y's innocent
damages are $70,000, Y would be entitled, after application of set-off,
to a judgment of $20,000. X would receive no affirmative judgment.
X and Y would each be required to personally bear $50,000 of inno-
cent loss.87 If set-off is not applied, the $100,000 of loss borne by X
and Y is spread interpersonally through insurance among all those
participating in the same or a similar activity. This pattern removes
the socially dislocating economic effect which would occur if X and
Y bear their own personally innocent damages; it transforms these
damages, in effect, into enterprise liability. This is the preferred system
of the two; each person participating in the enterprise bears a portion
of the innocent losses.88
Calabresi for much of the terminology employed in this article; the author has attempted
to apply Professor Calabresi's basic theses regarding secondary loss distribution to the
pure comparative negligence model adopted in Hoffman.
87. For a description of how set-off is related to an unnecessary reduction in
personally innocent damages, see text accompanying note 57 supra.
88. See Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents:- An Approach to Nonfault Allocation
of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REv. 713, 714 (1965).
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III. CONTRIBUTION
A. The Rule Prohibiting Contribution
The substantive law of torts consists in large part of a body of
rules upon which is based the decision to shift or apportion losses
among persons involved in an injury causing incident. Fundamental
doctrinal revision of these rules, as in Hoffman, requires attention not
only to the element of a prima facie cause of action and, therefore,
to the effects upon primary accident costs; such revision also requires
attention to the efficiency of the resulting system in minimizing un-
necessary financial loss. An effective system of tort law must include
a set of rules by which the decision to shift tort losses may be made;
the system should also incorporate the most economical and efficient
method of loss allocation among the parties ultimately liable for those
losses.
Historically, two parties actively involved in the legal cause of an
injury were not required to share the consequences of liability for
that injury.89 In other words, there is no common law right to con-
tribution among joint tortfeasors. 90 Florida followed the common law
prohibition against contribution 9' but, at the same time, permitted
89. Remember that joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable to a successful
claimant. The claimant has the right to execute his judgment against one or all
of the joint tortfeasors in an amount fully equalling the claimant's judgment. At common
law, a joint tortfeasor could not seek contribution from another joint tortfeasor for
payment of a joint and several liability. However, it generally has been recognized
that a surety could seek contribution from a co-surety for payment on an obligation,
even though, unknown to each other, they became sureties on that obligation at
different times. See Love v. Gibson, 2 Fla. 598, 618-19 (1849); Leflar, Contribution
and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130, 135 (1932).
90. The rule prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors has been attributed
to the English case, Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). In
Merryweather, two tortfeasors had earlier been sued in an action in which they were
adjudged joint tortfeasors. The plaintiff in that action levied his entire judgment
against one of the tortfeasors, who subsequently brought suit against his accomplice
for "contribution of a moiety." The case was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal,
the Merryweather court affirmed the dismissal. See also note 106 infra.
91. The rule prohibiting contribution among tortfeasors was accepted in Florida
as an integral part of English common law. Florida became a territory of the United
States in 1822; legislative power was vested in the Governor and in a Legislative Council.
Act of Mar. 30, 1822, ch. 13, § 2, 3 Stat. 654. The Council passed an act adopting
the English statutory and common law in effect prior to the fourth year of the reign
of James I of England, Fla. Terr. Act of Sept. 2, 1822. James I took the throne on
March 23, 1603. 12 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BarrANNICA, James r, 856, 857 (1967). Thus, the 1822
Florida Act adopted the English statutory and common law in effect prior to March 24,
1606, the beginning of James I's fourth year of reign. In 1823, however, the 1822
Florida Act was replaced by another which adopted the English statutory and common
law in effect prior to July 4, 1776. Fla. Terr. Act of June 29, 1823 (repealed by Fla.
Terr. Act of Nov. 23, 1828; reenacted by Fla. Terr. Act of Nov. 6, 1829). The law
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"apportionment" of damages among tortfeasors in selected situations.
In an action against several defendants, once it is established that
the acts of each defendant caused some damage, the further question
of the extent of each defendant's liability must be answered. If the
defendants acted in concert they are joint tortfeasors and will be held
jointly and severally liable for the entire damage. If they did not act
in concert, the Florida courts have traditionally examined the nature
of the injury complained of to determine whether the defendants will
be jointly and severally liable, or whether the damage caused the
plaintiff will be severally apportioned among the tortfeasors.
In Symmes v. Prairie Pebble Phosphate Co.,92 two defendants
owned property upstream of the plaintiff's oyster bed. Acting separately,
each defendant caused mud and refuse to be deposited in the river;
this diverted the flow of water sufficiently to destroy the plaintiff's
oyster bed. The plaintiff sued both defendants. The defendants de-
murred on the basis that there was no allegation of joint action and,
therefore, that they could not be sued as joint tortfeasors. The lower
court sustained the demurrer and, on appeal, the Supreme Court of
Florida affirmed, stating:
A joint tort is essential to the maintenance of a joint action for
damages therefor against several parties. For separate and distinct
wrongs in no wise connected by the ligament of a common purpose,
actual or implied by law, the wrongdoers are liable only in separate
actions and not jointly in the same action.9a
Thus, in 1913 the Supreme Court of Florida recognized, for the first
time, the doctrine of apportionment of damages among concurrent
tortfeasors. 4 Although the recognition of this doctrine seemed to
is now codified; it provides: "The common and statute laws of England which are
of a general and not a local nature . . . down to the 4th day of July, 1776, are
declared to be of force in this state ....... FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1975).
If the rule against contribution among joint tortfeasors originated with Merryweather
v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799) (see note 90 supra), then the rule need not
have become a part of the Florida common law; its acceptance may have been the
result of judicial error. The Merryweather decision was rendered 23 years after July 4,
1776. It has been argued, however, that the rule prohibiting contribution actually
originated with Battersey's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 41 (C.P. 1623), and that Merryweather
represents only the first clear enunciation of the rule. See Reath, Contribution Between
Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARv. L. REv.
176, 176-77 (1898). Of course, this is of historical interest only; without question, Florida
recognized the rule until the Florida Legislature adopted pro rata contribution in 1975.
See note 131 and text accompanying note 133 infra. "
92. 63 So. 1 (Fla. 1913).
93. Id. at 3.
94. Accord, Standard Phosphate Co. v. Lunn, 63 So. 429 (Fla. 1913).
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leave open the possibility of complete abolition of the rule pro-
hibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors, the court quickly ended
such speculation the following year. In Louisville & Nashville Rail-
road v. Allen, 95 it explained that the doctrine of apportionment of
damages among tortfeasors was limited to those situations where tort-
feasors, not acting in concert, caused distinctly separate injuries to
the plaintiff. The court alternatively limited the doctrine to those
situations where a single injury is caused which is capable of division
and whose cause is capable of attribution to a particular tortfeasor.
In all other cases the tortfeasors would be jointly and severally liable.96
The court accepted the following as a correct statement of the rule:
[T]he rule under which parties become jointly liable as tort feasors
extends beyond acts or omissions which are designedly co-operative,
and beyond any relation between the wrongdoers. If their acts of
negligence, however separate and distinct in themselves, are con-
current in producing the injury, their liability is joint as well as
several. . . . Each becomes liable because of his neglect of duty,
and they are jointly liable for the single injury inflicted because the
acts or omissions of both have contributed to it. 7
Where the negligence of two tortfeasors causes a single indivisible
result, the tortfeasors are treated as joint tortfeasors and are jointly
and severally liable. Apportionment lies only when multiple tort-
feasors are found to be "concurrent" tortfeasors.
Concurrent tortfeasors are tortfeasors who do not act in concert
and whose separate acts cause severable damage.", They are liable only
for the damages which they have caused. Thus, when the successive
negligence of two parties causes injury which is capable of division,
each is held liable only for that portion of the damages caused by his
own negligence.9 9 The burden of proving that the plaintiff's injuries
95. 65 So. 8 (Fla. 1914).
96. 65 So. at 12, quoting Brown v. Coxe Bros. & Co., 75 F. 689, 690 (C.C.E.D. Wis.
1896).
97. Brown v. Coxe Bros. & Co., 75 F. 689, 690 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1896).
98. The rule has been stated as follows:
Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each
cause to a single harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A(I) (1965).
99. Alternatively, the tortfeasor may seek indemnity. In Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 302
So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974), the defendants were held liable for injuries
to the plaintiff caused by an automobile accident and aggravation of injuries which
the defendants claimed were caused by a treating physician's malpractice. The defendants
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are capable of division and assignment by cause is upon the tort-
feasors. 1° If the tortfeasors fail in their burden of proof, they are
treated as joint tortfeasors and are jointly and severally liable. The
issue of factual causation does not dictate which damages are apportion-
able. Rather, convenience, practicality, and administrative expedience
dictate when the doctrine should be applied. If the injury caused to
the plaintiff by multiple tortfeasors is capable of being split into con-
stituent parts which may be easily attributed to individual tortfeasors,
the doctrine is applied. Where this is not the case, the tortfeasors are
treated as joint tortfeasors and each is held jointly and severally liable
for the entire injury. Since the essential distinction between multiple
tortfeasors and concurrent tortfeasors turns upon the practical
possibilities of the division of damages and the attribution of discrete
damages to a particular actor-tortfeasor, the jury in an action in which
the tortfeasors seek apportionment is required to find that the damages
caused by the tortfeasors are subject to attribution by cause among
them.1'01 Under apportionment, the plaintiff is awarded individual
judgments against each tortfeasor for the amount of the plaintiff's
injury which the jury finds was caused by that tortfeasor. When
the claimant receives indivisible injuries through the acts of multiple
parties, such distribution is impossible and the tortfeasors are jointly
and severally liable. An Illinois court stated the rationale for this
rule as follows: " 'When the contributory action of all accomplishes a
filed a third party complaint against the physician, seeking indemnification from him
of the amount of damages for which they were held liable as a result of the physician's
aggravation of the plaintiff's injuries. In granting the defendants the right to in-
demnity, the appellate court stated that there was no right to contribution among tort-
feasors. Id. at 190. The court continued:
[A] tort feasor initially causing an injury has the right to seek indemnification
against the physician for aggravating injury in the course of treatment. Recognition
of this principle (whether denominated as an exception upon or limitation to
the no contribution rule) is consistent with (having little difference in character
and quality from) the so-called "active-passive" negligence exception and the
so-called "duty" exception previously recognized by the courts of this state
as a method of mitigating the "inflexible rule against contribution".
Id. at 194 (footnote omitted). See note 104 infra.
100. See C.F. Hamblen, Inc. v. Owens, 172 So. 694 (Fla. 1937); Wise v. Carter, 119
So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
101. Thus, even though the defendants do not have a common design, or do not
have a common duty, or are not guilty of the same acts of negligence, they will be
treated as joint tortfeasors if a single indivisible injury results. Hudson v. Weiland, 8
So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1942); Randle-Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Millens, 294 So. 2d 38
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); see also Putnam Lumber Co. v. Berry, 2 So. 2d 133, 140
(Fla. 1941). And if a defendant's negligence combines with a vis major, the defendant
will be liable for the entire injury unless the defendant can establish that a rational
basis for division exists. See, e.g., Win. G. Roe & Co. v. Armour & Co., 414 F.2d 862
(5th Cir. 1969) (applying Florida law).
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particular result, it is unimportant to the party injured that one con-
tributed much to the injury, and another little; the one least guilty
is liable for all because he aided in accomplishing all.' "102
The foregoing statement contains the grain of rationality behind
the traditional reluctance to endorse unlimited application of the
doctrine of apportionment. Once the jury apportions the plaintiff's
damages among multiple tortfeasors, the plaintiff receives individual
judgments against each of the tortfeasors. Since the jury determines
that each tortfeasor legally caused only that amount of damage, the
tortfeasor cannot be legally held accountable for any of the plaintiff's
damages in excess of that amount. Thus, the plaintiff must seek to
execute his respective judgments individually against the various tort-
feasors. And if the plaintiff cannot collect judgment against a particular
tortfeasor, the innocently injured plaintiff must suffer the burden of
this loss. No recourse is available against the other tortfeasors in any
amount exceeding the apportioned share as found by the jury.
Although concurrent tortfeasors are only liable for the damages
which the jury finds that they caused, in Florida joint tortfeasors
(tortfeasors who act together or who cause a single indivisible result)
are jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the legally
provable damages caused to the plaintiff through their combined
fault. "The rule is ...well settled that, if an injury be caused by
the concurring negligence of two parties, either is liable to the injured
party to the same extent as though it had been caused by his negligence
alone."'' ° Once the plaintiff receives a joint and several judgment
against the tortfeasors, he may collect that full judgment once against
any individual or any combination of the tortfeasors. The rule pro-
hibiting contribution does not allow the tortfeasor who compensates
the plaintiff to receive any court-enforced financial assistance from his
co-tortfeasors. Once the plaintiff executes his judgment in full, any
attempts at loss allocation among active co-tortfeasors are barred,
whether the co-tortfeasors were parties to the action or not.04
102. West Chicago St. R.R. v. Feldstein, 69 Ill. App. 36, 37 (1897), quoting with
approval T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 155 (2d ed. 1888).
103. H.E. Wolfe Const. Co. v. Ellison, 174 So. 594, 605 (Fla. 1936); see Nichols v.
Rothkopf, 185 So. 725 (Fla. 1939).
104. Florida courts have long recognized the concept of implied indemnity; the
doctrine permits a secondarily liable tortfeasor to receive full compensation from a
primarily liable tortfeasor. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec.
Protective Co., 143 So. 316 (Fla. 1932); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co.,
166 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964). Indemnity may arise out of an express
contract or out of liability imposed by law. One court expressed the rule as follows:
[Implied indemnity is permitted] when the active negligence of one tort-feasor
and the passive negligence of another tort-feasor combine and proximately
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. The rule prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors has
been criticized extensively on the basis that it is unfair or unsound
social policy. 05 The rule does not facilitate reduction of primary
accident costs. And it has a definitely detrimental effect upon loss
transference once the primary accident cost reduction feature has
been exhausted.
B. Rules Allowing Contribution
Any rule of contribution begins to operate procedurally only upon
the happening of two events: (1) a jury determination that the tort-
feasors are liable for the injuries caused by their conduct, and (2) a
tortfeasor's payment of more than the legal share of his liability to
the plaintiff. Loss avoidance-primary accident cost reduction-is
effected by application of the rules of tort liability. A system of con-
tribution, however, purports to effect loss transference-the shifting of
the secondary costs of the fault system.
The plaintiff controls the litigation; if he sues only one of multiple
tortfeasors, the chosen defendant has no recourse against his co-
cause an injury to a third person. . . . In such case, the passively negligent tort-
feasor, who is compelled to pay damages to the injured person on account of
the injury, is entitled to indemnity from the actively negligent tort-feasor.
Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 75 S.E.2d 768, 771 (N.C. 1953), quoted
with approval in Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45, 49 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1963). However, implied indemnification shifts the entire burden of loss from
one tortfeasor to another and does not allocate losses among multiple tortfeasors. The
triggering mechanism for such loss shifting generally revolves around classification of
tortfeasors as active-passive or as primary-secondary. No loss allocation is possible
between active tortfeasors through the vehicle of implied indemnification. But see Stuart
v. Hertz Corp., 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974) discussed in note 99 supra.
105. See generally, C. GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
(1936); Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q.
552 (1936); Furnish, Distributing Tort Liability: Contribution and Indemnity in Iowa,
52 IOWA L. REV. 31 (1966); Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform
Practice, 1938 Wis. L. Rav. 365; Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors,
81 U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932); Turck, Contribution Between Tortfeasors in American
and German Law-A Comparative Study, 41 TULANE L. REv. 1 (1966); Note, Toward A
Workable Rule of Contribution in the Federal Courts, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 123 (1965);
Comment, Contribution Among Tort!easors: The Need for Clarification, 8 J. MAR. J. OF
PRAC. & PROC. 75 (1974); Comment, The Rule in Merryweather v. Nixan, 17 LAW Q. Rav.
293 (1901); Note, Recent Developments in Tortfeasor Contribution in Illinois, 5 Loy.
CHI. L.J. 496 (1974); Comment, Contribution Between Joint Tort-feasors in Wisconsin,
43 MAR9. L. REV. 102 (1959); Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 44 TEx.
L. REV. 326 (1965). The rule's defense by Professor Fleming James sparked a sprightly
debate between Professor James and Professor Charles Gregory. See James, Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L. Rav. 1156 (1941); Gregory,
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARv. L. REV. 1170 (1941);
James, Replication, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1178 (1941); Gregory, Rejoinder, 54 HARV. L. Rav.
1184 (1941).
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tortfeasors unless a rule of contribution applies. Similarly, even if the
plaintiff does sue more than one of multiple tortfeasors, once those
tortfeasors have been adjudged liable, the plaintiff may execute his
entire judgment against only one of them. Of course, the plaintiff
will normally be guided by expediency in the collection of a judg-
ment rather than by an attempt to do rough justice among tortfeasors.
Indeed, the liability of many tortfeasors is predicated upon rules of
negligence which assume no moral culpability beyond that of
negligence. In a jurisdiction which prohibits contribution among tort-
feasors, the deterrent effect which the fault system purportedly has
upon tortfeasors is vitiated by the probability that only one tortfeasor
will be assessed full liability for injuries caused by all. Since a rule of
contribution necessarily implies a sharing of common liability among
solvent tortfeasors, all liable tortfeasors will be held financially
responsible for the injuries caused by their tortious conduct. Such a
rule enhances rather than detracts from primary cost reduction. Assum-
ing that liability for fault-caused injuries acts as a deterrent, the
certainty of some liability is a more effective deterrent than the
possibility of full liability or no liability. Unlike apportionment, when
contribution applies, any risk of loss falls upon the tortfeasor who pays
more than his share of liability to the plaintiff; risk of loss does not
fall on the injured party. A rule of contribution imposes the burden
of loss for an indigent tortfeasor upon a co-tortfeasor who must
affirmatively seek recoupment from his co-tortfeasors-not upon the
injured party attempting to collect compensation for his personally
innocent damages.
In addition to transference of such secondary costs among joint
tortfeasors, a system of contribution has a second positive feature:
shared financial responsibility for a common legal liability. Allocation
of tort damages among all parties participating in the enterprise
insures that the effects of substantial legal liability are interpersonally
spread. Once the proscribed conduct is described and the party made
to account for his conduct, the deterrent aspects of the fault system
are satisfied. There is no further justification for insisting upon addi-
tional economic dislocation to a tortfeasor; commission of a tort does
not entail moral culpability necessitating punishment.106
106. If the acts committed are sufficiently heinous to warrant a punishment, a
legislative decision to criminalize this conduct should be made. But the presence and,
in some cases, the legal necessity of liability insurance for certain areas of conduct
indicates a policy decision that a deterrent system of interpersonal and intertemporal
loss allocation is sufficient for most areas of conduct.
Interestingly, the rule prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors was originally
applied against joint tortfeasors who committed intentional torts. See Merryweather v.
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By 1975 over thirty state jurisdictions and the District of Columbia
had abandoned the rule prohibiting contribution. °7 In Florida, how-
Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799), summarized in note 90 supra. But the rule
prohibiting contribution cannot be an effective deterrent against intentional tortious
action unless the tortfeasor is aware of the rule. He then knows that the plaintiff
may collect his entire judgment from any of the joint tortfeasors. He also knows that
the tortfeasor from whom the plaintiff seeks compensation will bear the full burden
of the loss without recourse to his co-tortfeasors. That may act as a deterrent.
Of course, if an intentional joint tortfeasor knows of the rule prohibiting contribu-
tion, he also knows that the plaintiff may not attempt to collect a judgment from him
at all. The joint tortfeasor knows that he will not be forced to make any payment if
the plaintiff collects judgment from a co-tortfeasor. Thus, the intentional joint tort-
feasor may gamble that he will not incur any liability.
But if contribution among tortfeasors is permitted, an intentional joint tortfeasor
would know that he will be responsible for some portion of the plaintiff's damages.
A rule permitting contribution may serve as more of a deterrent to an intentional
tortfeasor than a rule prohibiting contribution. See generally Jones, Contribution Among
Tortfeasors, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 175, 180-81 (1958); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity
Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130, 133-34 (1932).
As with deterrence, the possibility that the intentional joint tortfeasor might avoid
any liability renders the damages assessment of little effect as punishment for tortious
conduct. This is especially true since the plaintiff's attorney is more interested in
collecting a judgment than in assessing moral guilt among joint tortfeasors.
One commentator has suggested that there are two reasons for the existence of
the rule denying contribution among tortfeasors: (1) to punish past conduct and
therefore deter future misconduct on the part of wrongdoers; and (2) to prevent
expenditure of valuable court time in the resolution of disputes among wrongdoers.
Leflar, supra at 133-34. Thus, at base, the real reason for prohibiting contribution
among intentional tortfeasors may be expressed ex turpi causa non oritur actio: "Out
of a base . . . consideration, an action does . . . not arise." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 663
(4th ed. 1951). See generally Leflar, supra at 130; see also H. BROOM, A SELECTION OF
LEGAL MAXIMS 464-65.
107. The pro rata contribution pattern of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act has served as a model for a number of state contribution statutes. For examples,
see ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010-.060 (1962); CALIF. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880 (West Supp.
1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 17 (1957); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231B (West Supp.
1976-77); MIcH. COMP. LAwS ANN. §§ 600.2925a-.2925d (West Supp. 1976-77); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 17.215-.325 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-I to -5 (West 1952); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § IB-1 to IB-8 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-2089 (Purdon 1967);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-6-1 to -11 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. 9H 23-3101 to -3106 (Cum.
Supp. 1975). A few jurisdictions have implemented schemes of pro rata contribution
judicially rather than legislatively. See Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Best v. Yerkes, 77 N.W.2d 23 (Iowa 1956); Scammon v. City of Saco, 247 A.2d 108 (Me.
1968); Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 229 N.W.2d 183 (Neb. 1975).
But some states, including Florida, employ some form of proportional contribution
based upon degrees of fault. The Arkansas and Idaho statutes provide:
When there is such disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors as to render
inequitable an equal distribution among them of the common liability by contribu-
tion, the relative degrees of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in
determining their pro rata shares solely for the purpose of determining their
rights of contribution among themselves, each remaining severally liable to the
injured person for the whole injury as at common law.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1002(4) (1962); IDAHO CODE § 6-803(3) (Cum. Supp. 1975); see
1977]
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ever, challenges to the rule prohibiting contribution were met with
frustration until the continued vitality of the rule was questioned by
the petitioner and amicus curiae in Hoffman v. Jones.0 8 Following
Hoffman, one federal judge predicted: "[Adoption of pure compara-
tive negligence] dictates the abolishment of the equally harsh rule
of no contribution among active tortfeasors. This Court feels confident
that the Supreme Court of Florida would agree."' 10 9 The Florida district
courts of appeal, however, exercised considerable restraint in deciding
whether the doctrine of comparative negligence was inconsistent with
the rule prohibiting contribution among tortfeasors." 0 Since the
Supreme Court of Florida reserved decision until the issue was ripe,"'
the reluctance of the district courts of appeal was most likely due to
the Hoffman court's strong admonitory language prohibiting the
district courts from overruling controlling supreme court decisions. 12
Finally, in Lincenberg v. Issen," 3 the Supreme Court of Florida
squarely faced, as a necessary corollary to its adoption of pure com-
parative negligence, the question of adopting some form of contribution
or of abandoning joint and several liability and permitting apportion-
DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 6302(d) (1974); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-12 (Supp. 1975). Other
states which have proportional contribution based on degrees of fault employ slightly
different language. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(1) (West Supp. 1977) (contribution
shall be "in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each"); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 1402 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1976-77) ("equitable shares shall be determined
in accordance with the relative culpability of each person liable for contribution");
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.445(1) (1975) ("proportional shares of tortfeasors in the entire
liability shall be based upon their relative degrees of fault or responsibility"). While
Florida once followed the pro rata contribution pattern of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act, it now follows a proportional scheme of contribution based
on fault. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (Supp. 1976) (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a)
(1975)); see note 131 and text accompanying note 133 infra.
108. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). See note 3 supra.
109. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., 367 F. Supp. 27, 37 (M.D.
Fla. 1973). See also Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385, 388 (Fla. 1973) (Dekle, J., con-
curring specially), in which Justice Dekle advocated discontinuance of the rule pro-
hibiting contribution among tortfeasors.
110. In every case, the district courts of appeal refused to abandon the rule pro-
hibiting contribution among tortfeasors. See Acevedo v. Acosta, 296 So. 2d 526, 528-29
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (recognizing rule prohibiting contribution); Maybarduk
v. Bustamante, 294 So. 2d 374, 378 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (suggesting that the
Hoffman court did not intend to alter the rule prohibiting contribution); Rader v.
Variety Children's Hosp., 293 So. 2d 778, 779-80 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (refusing
to abrogate rule prohibiting contribution); Issen v. Lincenberg, 293 So. 2d 777, 778
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), rev'd, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975) (suggesting that the
Hoffman court recognized the continued existence of the rule).
111. See note 3 supra.
112. The Hoffman court stated: "To allow a District Court of Appeal to overrule
controlling precedent of this court would be to create chaos and uncertainty in the
judicial forum, particularly at the trial level." 280 So. 2d at 434.
113. 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975), rev'g 293 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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ment of damages among joint tortfeasors."1 In Issen, the plaintiff,
Minnie Issen, was a fault-free passenger injured in a two-car accident.
The trial court submitted special interrogatories to the jury,11 5 request-
ing that the jury determine the percentages of negligence attributable
to Harry Lincenberg and Ronald Rhodes, the two drivers. 16 The
jury fixed the plaintiff's damages at $20,000; it determined that Lincen-
berg was 15% negligent and that Rhodes was 85% negligent. 1  The
trial court was uncertain whether it should enter judgment in full
against both tortfeasors jointly and severally or whether it should
enter judgment against the defendants in the percentages of negligence
returned by the jury.118
The plaintiff urged the court to adopt a rule of apportionment. 19
Thus, the plaintiff wanted the court to enter two judgments: one
against Lincenberg for $3,000120 and one against Ronald and Eleanor
Rhodes121 for $17,000.122 When the case reached the Third District
Court of Appeal on a question certified by the trial court,123 the district
114. In Issen, the petitioner urged the court to apportion the plaintiff's damages
according to the percentage of negligence attributed to each of two tortfeasors. 318
So. 2d at 389. For a discussion of the procedural differences between apportionment
and contribution, see text accompanying notes 91-104 supra.
115. In Hoffman, the Supreme Court of Florida authorized the use of special
verdicts to accomplish the purposes of pure comparative negligence. 280 So. 2d at 439.
For an interesting discussion of the use of special verdicts in a modified comparative
negligence jurisdiction, see Cadena, Comparative Negligence and the Special Verdict,
5 ST. MARY's L.J. 688 (1974).
116. There were three defendants: Harry Lincenberg, the driver of the car in
which the plaintiff was a passenger; Ronald Rhodes, the driver of the second car;
and Eleanor Rhodes, the owner of the second car. 318 So. 2d at 387. While the
jury attributed negligence to all three defendants, Eleanor Rhodes was only vicariously
liable as the owner of the car driven by Ronald. See note 63 supra.
117. 318 So. 2d at 387-88.
118. 318 So. 2d at 388. Entry of separate judgments against each defendant accord-
ing to the percentages of negligence returned by the jury is not to be confused with
proportional contribution. If proportional contribution were applied, the court would
enter one $20,000 judgment against Lincenberg and Rhodes jointly and severally. After
one of the defendants paid the plaintiff more than his proportional share of the
damages, the court would permit the defendants to allocate such payments between
themselves. That is, if Lincenberg paid the plaintiff more than $3,000 (15% of $20,000),
Lincenberg would be entitled to collect any amount exceeding $3,000 from Rhodes.
If the plaintiff executed against Rhodes and Rhodes paid the $20,000 judgment in
full, Rhodes would then be entitled to collect $3,000 from Lincenberg.
119. See note 114 supra.
120. 15% x $20,000 = $3,000.
121. See note 116 supra.
122. 85% x $20,000 = $17,000.
123. The trial court wanted the district court of appeal to determine the propriety
of instructing the jury to apportion fault. 293 So. 2d at 778. See note 118 and accompany-
ing text supra.
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court declined to discontinue the rule prohibiting contribution. 2 4 The
district court of appeal further stated that the doctrine of comparative
negligence did not apply where the plaintiff was not contributorily
negligent. 2 5 Thus, the joint tortfeasors remained jointly and severally
liable.
The Supreme Court of Florida assumed jurisdiction of Issen on
the ground that the district court decision conflicted with the supreme
court's decision in Hoffman.126 Assuming that the supreme court was
prepared to expand the rules of loss allocation among joint tortfeasors,
it had two primary options: it could have expanded the common law
rules of apportionment, permitting damages in negligence actions to be
apportioned among joint tortfeasors and judgments to be entered
accordingly;' 2 7 or it could have acquiesced in the legislature's model
for contribution 1 28 and preserved the doctrine of joint and several
liability among joint tortfeasors. Certainly, the court was fully pre-
pared to abandon the archaic prohibition against contribution among
joint tortfeasors. As Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, stated:
There is no equitable justification for recognizing the right of the
plaintiff to seek recovery on the basis of apportionment of fault
while denying the right of fault allocation as between negligent
defendants. Courts in other states which have receded from the
doctrine of no contribution have emphasized the unfairness and
injustice of placing the entire burden upon the one who happens
to be called upon to pay the entire damages where such payment
should in justice be shared by another who shared the responsibility
for the injury.129
The court acknowledged that it had considered several different
models of loss allocation-including apportionment and proportional
124. 293 So. 2d at 778. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
125. 293 So. 2d at 778. Because the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, the
district court disapproved the trial court's instruction to the jury to apportion liability
according to the degrees of fault of the two joint tortfeasors. The doctrine of pure
comparative negligence requires computation only of the plaintiff's degree of fault
to determine his self-responsibility discount.
Recall the hypothetical posed in the text accompanying Tables 1 and 5 supra.
Computation of three hypothetical parties' degrees of negligence can be justified in
that each party is asserting an affirmative claim to which the doctrine of comparative
negligence applies. The doctrine forces a percentage reduction in each party's amount
of claimed damages.
126. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 1975).
127. The Vermont, New Hampshire, and Nevada statutes represent the clearest
examples of this form of loss distribution. See notes 19-20 supra. The Vermont and New
Hampshire statutes were considered by the Issen court. 318 So. 2d 392 n.2.
128. See note 131 and text accompanying note 133 infra.
129. 318 So. 2d at 391.
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contribution.13° But, while the case was pending in the supreme court,
the Florida Legislature had adopted the pro rata contribution scheme
of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.13 1 The court
130. 318 So. 2d at 392 & n.2. One justice suggested that the court could have
ruled that the doctrine of pure comparative negligence required that the relative degrees
of fault of joint tortfeasors be considered in assessing liability. See 318 So. 2d at 394
(Boyd, J., concurring specially). Although the rules of apportionment and proportional
contribution may have different practical effects upon the plaintiff, both result in the
same ultimate allocation of loss when the tortfeasors are solvent. Since a pro rata
contribution model purports to achieve equality of loss sharing based upon enterprise
participation, application of a multiple judgment scheme would circumvent, by per-
mitting proportional loss allocation, the legislative intent in adopting pro rata contribu-
tion.
131. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-108 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (Supp. 1976)).
See 318 So. 2d at 392. The law provided:
(I) SHORT TITLE.-This act shall be cited as the Uniform Contribution
among Tortfeasors Act.
(2) RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION.-
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons
become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property
or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them
even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.
(b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has
paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery
is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tort-
feasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the
entire liability.
(c) There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has in-
tentionally (willfully or wantonly) caused or contributed to the injury or wrong-
ful death.
(d) A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled
to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury
or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to
any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.
(e) A liability insurer, who by payment has discharged in full or in part
the liability of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation as
insurer, is subrogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution to the extent of
the amount it has paid in excess of the tortfeasor's pro rata share of the common
liability. This provision does not limit or impair any right of subrogation arising
from any other relationship.
(f) This act does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law.
Where one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the
indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnity
obligor is not entitled to contribution from the obligee for any portion of his
indemnity obligation.
(g) This act shall not apply to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obliga-
tion.
(3) PRO RATA SHARES.-In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors
in the entire liability.
(a) Their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered;
(b) If equity requires the collective liability of some as a group shall
constitute a single share; and
(c) Principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply.
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accepted the legislative scheme and quashed the decision of the Third
District Court of Appeal. The concept of joint and several liability
of joint tortfeasors was preserved. 3 2
In 1976, the Florida Legislature abandoned the pro rata system
of contribution which it had adopted in 1975, replacing it with a
contribution system in which fault is the basis of allocation.'
(4) ENFORCEMENT.-
(a) Whether or not judgment has been entered in an action against two or
more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be
enforced by separate action.
(b) Where a judgment has been entered in an action against two or more
tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced
in that action by judgment in favor of one against other judgment defendants
by motion upon notice to all parties to the action.
(c) If there is a judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tort-
feasor seeking contribution, any separate action by him to enforce contribution
must be commenced within 1 year after the judgment has become final by lapse of
time for appeal or after appellate review.
(d) If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the
tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he
has either:
1. Discharged by payment the common liability within the statute of limita-
tions period applicable to claimant's right of action against him and has
commenced his action for contribution within one year after payment, or
2. Agreed while action is pending against him to discharge the common
liability and has within 1 year after the agreement paid the liability and
commenced his action for contribution.
(e) The recovery of a judgment for an injury or wrongful death against one
tortfeasor does not of itself discharge the other tortfeasors from liability for the
injury or wrongful death unless the judgment is satisfied. The satisfaction of
the judgment does not impair any right of contribution.
(f) The judgment of the court in determining the liability of the several
defendants to the claimant for an injury or wrongful death shall be binding as
among such defendants in determining their right to contribution.
(5) RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE.-When a release or a
covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one
of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful
death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the
injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim
against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the
covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the
greater; and,
(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
contribution to any other tortfeasor.
(6) UNIFORMITY OF INTERPRETATION.-This act shall be so interpreted
and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of
those states that enact it.
132. 318 So. 2d at 392.
133. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-108, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (1975))
was amended in the 1976 legislative session to provide: "Their relative degrees of
fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability." 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-186, § 1
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C. Allocation Models
The plaintiff in Issen postulated a system of apportionment, which
was rejected. For a one-year period, Florida followed the pro rata
contribution scheme of the Uniform Act. Florida now follows a fault-
based proportional contribution system. The remainder of this article
examines the effects of each of these models upon allocation of tort
losses in Florida.
1. Apportionment and Fault-based Proportional Contribution-
Recall the hypothetical posed in Table 1 and Table 5. Application
of an apportionment model would result in the judgments computed
in Table 11.
TABLE 11
A v.B
A's damages $15,000
times B's percentage of negligence x 65%
A's judgment against B $ 9,750
B's damages $38,000
times A's percentage of negligence x 25%
B's judgment against A $ 9,500
Av.C
A's damages $15,000
times C's percentage of negligence x 10%
A's judgment against C $ 1,500
C's damages $ 6,000
times A's percentage of negligence x 25%
C's judgment against A $ 1,500
Bv.C
B's damages $38,000
times C's percentage of negligence x 10%
B's judgment against C $ 3,800
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (Supp. 1976)). The amendment took effect June
20, 1976, and applies to all actions filed or settled after the amendment became effective.
1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-186, §§ 2-3. Thus, for one year Florida had the opportunity
to operate under a pro rata system of contribution in which degrees of fault were
not considered.
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C's damages $ 6,000
times B's percentage of negligence x 65%
C's judgment against B $ 3,900
The results shown in Table 11 are dictated by the conclusion that
the self-responsibility discount is the same as the fault-transferring
factor.
The Table 11 results could be reached in two ways: (1) as ad-
vocated by the petitioner in Issen, the court could enter separate judg-
ments against the parties in the amounts of the verdicts; or (2) the
court could preserve joint and several liability and permit the tort-
feasors to seek contribution in the proportions indicated. 3 4 The pro-
cedural aspects of these alternatives are different, but the results will
be the same if all parties to the action are solvent. 3 5
Note, though, that application of a proportional contribution or
apportionment scheme dramatically alters the rights and liabilities
of A, B, and C from the initial verdicts computed under pure com-
parative negligence. Table 12 shows the ultimate rights and liabilities
of each party absent application of apportionment or contribution.
TABLE 12136
Judgments for A $11,250
Judgments against A $18,700
134. The latter method is that of Florida's fault contribution scheme. New York
is the only other state to have adopted pure comparative negligence and a contribution
statute which incorporates the presumption that the self-responsibility discount is
the same as the fault-transferring factor. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 1402, 1411 (McKinney
1976).
135. The manner of loss allocation under the apportionment scheme requires
entry of claimants' judgments against each of the tortfeasors. Ignoring the doctrine
of set-off for the moment, six judgments would be entered as shown in Table 11.
Under a proportional contribution statute, since the doctrine of joint and several
liability applies, only three judgments would be entered: judgment for A against B
and C for $11,250; judgment for B against A and C for $13,300; judgment for C against
A and B for $5,400. See notes 26-29 and Table 5 in accompanying text supra. But under
the proportional scheme, the party paying more than his proportional share of the
mutual liability would have an action over against his co-tortfeasor. Thus, if C paid
A the entire liability of $11,250 owed to A by B and C, C would have the right to
contribution of $9,750 from B.
In an apportionment scheme, since the plaintiff theoretically does not receive a
judgment from a tortfeasor greater than the damages caused by that tortfeasor, the
burden of a tortfeasor's possible insolvency falls upon the plaintiff. But, because the
judgments are joint and several in a proportional contribution scheme, those burdens
of loss fall upon the tortfeasors and not upon the claimants.
136. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
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Judgments for B $13,300
Judgments against B $16,650
Judgments for C $ 5,400
Judgments against C $24,550
Table 13 shows the potential rights and liabilities of each party after
application of an apportionment rule, assuming that each of the
parties is financially solvent.1 7
TABLE 13
Judgments for A $11,250 l3s
Judgments against A $11,000.-
Judgments for B $13,30014o
Judgments against B $13,650...
Judgments for C $ 5,400142
Judgments against C $ 5,3004-
Application of this allocation model transfers "innocent" damages14 4
of $29,950'45 from the persons suffering the damages to the persons
responsible for causing the damages.
But if the doctrine of set-off, as initially interpreted by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Bournazian 14 were applied, a radical alteration
137. Since an apportionment scheme imposes the risk of loss for an insolvent tort-
feasor upon the claimant, the amounts collectible would be adversely affected by the
presence of a liable but insolvent party. A contribution, scheme imposes the risk of
loss for an insolvent tortfeasor upon the tortfeasor seeking contribution; a tortfeasor's
right to judicially enforce contribution is thus contingent upon the solvency of the
other tortfeasors.
138. $9,750 (A's judgment against B) + $1,500 (A's judgment against C) = $11,250.
See Table 11.
139. $9,500 (B's judgment against A) + $1,500 (C's judgment against A) = $11,000.
See Table 11.
140. $9,500 (B's judgment against A) + $3,800 (B's judgment against C) = $13,300.
See Table 11.
141. $9,750 (A's judgment against B) + $3,900 (C's judgment against B) = $13,650.
See Table 11.
142. $1,500 (C's judgment against A) + $3,900 (C's judgment against B) = $5,400.
See Table 11.
143. $1,500 (A's judgment against C) + $3,800 (B's judgment against C) = $5,300.
See Table 11.
144. Recall that innocent damages are determined by reducing a claimant's total
damages by his self-responsibility discount.
145. $11,250 (A's innocent damages) + $13,300 (B's innocent damages) + $5,400
(C's innocent damages) = $29,950.
146. Bournazian opinion on rehearing, 342 So. 2d at 472-73, Appendix B at 125 infra.
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of the above loss distribution would occur. The procedural dis-
similarities between an apportionment scheme and fault-related, pro-
portional contribution would create strangely divergent results. In-
jection of the set-off doctrine into an apportionment scheme, such as
that advocated by the Issen plaintiff, might result in the loss pattern
shown in Table 14.
TABLE 14
Av.B
A's damages
times B's percentage of negligence
$15,000
x 65%
A's verdict against B $ 9,750
B's damages $38,000
times A's percentage of negligence x 25%
B's verdict against A $9,500
Application of set-off requires that B's smaller
verdict of $9,500 be subtracted from A's larger
verdict of $9,750. A receives judgment for $250
against B.
Av.C
A's damages $15,000
times C's percentage of negligence x 10%
A's verdict against C $ 1,500
C's damages
times A's percentage of negligence
$ 6,000
x 25%
C's verdict against A $ 1,500
Application of set-off results in no affirmative
judgment.
Bv.C
B's damages $38,000
times C's percentage of negligence x 10%
B's verdict against C $ 3,800
For a discussion of the supreme court's application of set-off in the initial Bournazian
opinion, see notes 72-79 and accompanying text supra.
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C's damages $ 6,000
times B's percentage of negligence x 65%
C's verdict against B $ 3,900
Application of set-off requires that B's smaller
verdict of $3,800 be subtracted from C's larger
verdict of $3,900. C receives judgment for $100
against B.
Thus, although A suffers $11,250 innocent damages, B suffers $13,300
innocent damages, and C suffers $5,400 innocent damages, the court
would award a $250 judgment for A against B and a $100 judgment
for C against B. Total innocent damages of $29,950 were suffered, but
only $350 is exchanged.
The apportionment model assumes that each tortfeasor will be
liable only for the percentage of his fault to the total cause of the
injuries. Because of this feature, the introduction of additional "tort-
feasors" would be good litigation strategy. It may be assumed that,
as the number of potential "tortfeasors" increases, the percentages of
liability assessed against named tortfeasors would correspondingly
decrease-perhaps in sufficient percentages to make the additional
litigation costs worthwhile.
Injection of the set-off doctrine into a fault-based, proportional
contribution scheme would yield even more perverse results. Setting
off the common liabilities, a trial court could enter verdicts according
to any of the three variations shown in Table 13. Thus, three judg-
ment patterns emerge: $3,350 judgment for A against B and C; $7,450
judgment for B against A and C; or $3,350 judgment for C against
A and B. Suppose the court awards judgment for A in the amount
of $3,350. A may proceed to execute that judgment in full against
B or C. If A collects from C, C has the right to seek contribution
from B. And since A's damages are already reduced by his self-
responsibility discount, B and C will most likely be held, under the
proportional contribution statute, to ratios of contribution identical
to their ratios of negligence as found by the jury. Since B was found
to be 65% negligent and C was found to be 10% negligent, C will be
entitled to contribution in the ratio of 1 to 6.5. Thus, C will be
entitled to receive $2,903.33 from B as contribution for the common
liability of $3,350 satisfied by C. Similarly bizarre results would occur
from the other judgment options available.147 These formulations
147. If a $7,450 judgment is entered for B against A and C, and B collects from
A, A has the right to seek contribution from C. Since A was found to be 25% negligent
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represent a mathematical precision which masks the basic imprecision
of tort law, and the formulations do nothing to change that inherent
imprecision. Indeed, to the extent that they appear to be a scientific
application of risk allocation based upon fault, the formulations pre-
vent meaningful change.
The changing face of tort law, which may be seen in the move-
ment from fault-based allocation of liability to allocation of liability
based upon enterprise involvement, will create additional problems
in a proportional contribution scheme. Since Florida's new contribu-
tion statute requires that fault be the basis of contribution, develop-
ment of the most reasonable loss allocation system is stymied by the
difficulties inherent in comparing the obligations of tortfeasors liable
for non-negligent torts to the obligations of negligent tortfeasors
whose negligent conduct contributes to the same injuries.
2. Pro Rata Contribution.-Under both the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act and the new Florida contribution statute,
an intentional tortfeasor may not seek contribution. 148 The Uniform
Act, however, does permit loss distribution when the joint tortfeasors
are liable under other theories. For example, in Chamberlain v.
Carborundum Co., 49 a federal court applying the Pennsylvania version
of the Uniform Act 50 permitted a party held strictly liable to seek
contribution from a negligent tortfeasor. Proportional contribution
does not automatically preclude the same result, but pro rata contribu-
tion among all parties liable for the same injury is a more efficient
means of reaching that result. The pro rata scheme spreads liability
in the most efficient manner among all tortfeasors involved in an in-
jury-producing event. The scheme avoids inter-tort jurisdictional litiga-
tion over degrees of fault in subsequent contribution actions involving
both fault and nonfault based liabilities.
There is more than operational efficiency to recommend pro rata
contribution among jointly and severally liable parties. Further
examination of the philosophical foundations of the various allocation
models will show the relevance of the maxim "equality is equity."
and C was found to be 10% negligent, their ratios of contribution would be 2.5 to 1.
C would be liable to A for $2,128.57 in contribution.
If the court enters a $3,350 judgment for C against A and B, and C collects from
A, A has the right to seek contribution from B. Since A was found to be 25% negligent
and B was found to be 65% negligent, the ratios of contribution would be 2.5 to 6.5. B
would be liable to A for $2,419.44 in contribution.
148. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTIoN AMONG ToRTFAsoRs ACT § 1(c); FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(c)
(Supp. 1976). For a discussion of the application of contribution and no-contribution
rules to intentional tortfeasors, see note 106 supra.
149. 485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973).
150. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-2089 (Purdon 1967).
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Under both Florida's proportional contribution statute and the
apportionment method proposed by the plaintiff in Issen, the parties of
the Table 1/Table 5 hypothetical-absent application of set-off-are
liable in the following amounts: A's total liability is $11,000, B's is
$13,650, and C's is $5,300.151 The percentages of undifferentiated
negligence of the parties can be stated in ratios as follows: A to B to
C = 25% to 65% to 10% = 2.5 to 6.5 to 1. Note, however, that
the proportional negligence procedure requires that the individual
parties contribute to the total compensable damages in ratios different
from the ratios of negligence. Table 15 shows the ratios of contribution
to the total liability fund absent application of set-off.
TABLE 15
A to B $11,000 to $13,650
A to C $11,000 to $ 5,300
B to C $13,650 to $ 5,300
Thus, A and B profit at C's expense (in large part because of the
fortuitous circumstance of C's relatively low damages even though C
was by far the least negligent). That the respective contributions of
A, B, and C are not in the ratios of 2.5 to 6.5 to 1152 indicates a
151. See Table 13.
It should be noted that the Bournazian court, on rehearing, did not totally
abandon the doctrine of set-off. Set-off still applies to the extent that two parties
receive verdicts for losses which each caused the other for uninsured liabilities. 342
So. 2d at 473-74, Appendix B at 126-27 infra. Thus, set-off would apply in order to reduce
the burden and cost of an unnecessary exchange of money between parties, none of
whom had attempted to spread losses through the expedience of insurance. Id., at 474,
Appendix B at 127 infra.
Interestingly, if only one party to an automobile accident had liability insurance,
that party would be entitled to receive compensation under his uninsured motorists
coverage for his innocent damages caused by an uninsured motorist. The uninsured
party who claimed damages from the insured party would be entitled to collect from
the insured party's insurance carrier under the liability provision. Thus, one party's
liability insurance carrier would pay for all innocent injuries arising from the accident,
regardless of the insured's fault. Of course, the insurance carrier would be subrogated
to its insured's claim against the uninsured party (for whatever value that may
have).
152. If each party's self-caused damages are also injected into the equation, the
ratios are 2.5 to 6.5 to 1. The subject in the text, however, is contributions to the
liability fund from which payments will be made to the other parties. For this purpose,
the fault aspect of the pure comparative negligence rule, which came into play for
the purpose of effecting the self-responsibility discount and computing the net innocent
damages, offers some incongruous results. It should not be considered for purposes
of computing contribution payment which is concerned with purely economic loss. Since
provable damages consist in large part of non-economic loss which is nonetheless
compensable from a tortfeasor, these figures may be abstracted from the "payments to"
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basic error in the procedure followed. The ratios of contribution are
based on the faulty premise that the initial percentages of liability
permit the conclusion that B was 6.5 times as negligent as C with
respect to A. But their ratios of liability are not in the same propor-
tions because of the fortuity of the amount of damage caused to each
of the parties. 1 53 It is doubtful that a jury would have intended this
result. The ratios shown in Table 15 are the ratios of each party's
liability under a proportional scheme. It is evident that these ratios
do not represent total provable damages. They do, however, represent
the total amount of the parties' liabilities to each other. If this method
of loss allocation is justified at all, it is justified by its claim to be an
expression of the jury's intent in computing the parties' degrees of
negligence. The unstated assumption behind the rationale for this
system of loss allocation is that the jury's determination was also
intended to compute the degrees of liability. Innocent damages of
$29,950, however, remain to be paid in proportions entirely in-
consistent with the percentages of negligence computed by the jury.
This occurs due to the truly accidental nature of damages. It is certainly
no fault of C that A, who was more at fault, suffered damages greatly
in excess of those suffered by C; and this "no-fault" aspect of the rule
cannot be ignored.
For these reasons, the apportionment and proportional contribu-
tion schemes do not effect the Hoffman court's intent in adopting
pure comparative negligence or a jury's intent in computing the
percentages of negligence. Pure comparative negligence requires that
the percentages of negligence be computed in order to assess the self-
responsibility discount for each party claimant. These percentages
are applied against the claimant's provable damages in order to com-
pute the claimant's total "innocent" damages. Transference of the
residual amount of the innocent damages derives from a second aspect
of the rule of pure comparative negligence grounded in absolute
liability.-M
table (Table 15). A tortfeasor liable to a claimant on a judgment will find little consola-
tion in knowing he is compensating the claimant for non-economic loss.
153. Ratios of total damages (not reduced by self-responsibility discounts), however,
would equal the ratios computed by the jury. The reduction in the parties' damages
matched by their liability to a claimant would permit such ratios to be developed.
The invalidity of this method of loss allocation is not expressly related to its essential
inability to give expression to the jury's intent, but to its inefficiency as a method of
loss allocation among parties liable for damages because of the inclusion in this calculus
of non-compensated damages.
154. The principle underlying pure comparative negligence was stated by the
Hoffman court in a conjunctive form which is misleading and ultimately indefensible
as inconsistent with the basic equitable nature of the rule. The court stated that "the
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Although this analysis may appear to represent a patent mis-
reading of the pure comparative negligence rule, 15 the Hoffman
court frankly acknowledged that the quantum of damages suffered
by a claimant in an injury-producing event may be truly accidental
and totally unrelated to the claimant's degree of fault.156 This rather
obvious fact lies at the equitable foundation of the pure comparative
negligence doctrine's reluctant acceptance that a party who is only
10% at fault may have to pay a judgment to someone who is 90%
at fault.1 57 It is no fault of the relatively blameless and uninjured
defendant that, under the rule, any portion of the more severely
negligent plaintiff's damages are transferable to him.-5  The pure
comparative negligence rule, nevertheless, is sound in terms of public
policy because the no-fault component of the risk is readily insurable
jury should give the plaintiff only such an amount proportioned with his negligence
and the negligence of the defendant." 280 So. 2d at 438. The Hoffman court also stated:
"When the negligence of more than one person contributes to the occurrence of an
accident, each should pay the proportion of the total damages he has caused the other
party." Id. at 437. The Hoffman court, however, was analyzing a two-party action in
which both parties suffered damages. The quoted language, therefore, can be under-
stood only in conjunction with the court's acceptance of the reciprocal relationship of
causal fault in the two-party action. As the computations from Table 15 indicate, such
reciprocity is not present in a multi-party action.
The inability of the Hoffman court to realize the absence of reciprocity in the
multi-party action resulted in its incorrect adoption of the doctrine of set-off. See note
157 infra.
155. This author acknowledges that the issue of the pure comparative negligence
doctrine has been briefed, argued, and decided as if it were totally grounded on the
fault principle. The doctrine requires the determination of fault, however, only (1) for
the computation of the claimant's self-responsibility discount to establish his "innocent"
damages and (2) as a necessary precedent to the transfer of the claimant's "innocent"
damages to a more blameworthy tortfeasor. Unless the transference is effected without
regard to the degree of fault, it would be necessary to abandon the doctrine of joint
and several liability and to properly instruct the jury as to the effect of its verdict.
156. 280 So. 2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1973).
157. This article does not analyze the wisdom of the pure comparative negligence
rule. The Hoffman court acknowledged the possibility that someone minimally at
fault will be forced to compensate someone principally at fault:
The liability of the defendant in such a case should not depend upon what
damages he suffered, but upon what damages he caused. If a jury found that
this defendant had been negligent and that his negligence, in relation to that
of the plaintiff, was 20 per cent responsible for causing the accident then he
should pay 20 per cent of the total damages, regardless of the fact that he has
been fortunate enough to not be damaged personally.
280 So. 2d at 439. The assumption is that all damages are self-caused or caused by
others. In a two-party situation, then, the determination of the percentage of the
self-caused factor is a perfect measure of the percentage of the other-caused element of
damages and constitutes a sound moral basis for loss shifting.
158. Of course, some causal negligence is necessary for the initial assessment of
liability; the question will most likely be reduced to a "but for" causation analysis.
See 280 So. 2d at 438.
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and should be insured. Acceptance of the Hohfeldian relationship 59
of degrees of fault as perfect reciprocals forces the conclusion that all
injury-causing factors are present-or the conclusion that one of the
parties present must assume responsibility for a non-present cause.1 0
Instructing the jury to compute the plaintiff's percentage of negligence
imposes the financial responsibility for "phantom-caused" negligent
damages on a defendant who is present but who may not be fully
responsible.
Applying this bifold analysis to the multi-party, multi-damage
action, the total percentage reduction in all damages suffered by the
parties must likewise total 100% under the Hoffman rule. This effects
a division as between the parties and effects a reduction in the parties'
damages consistent with the jury's determination of their reciprocal
percentages of fault. But since quantum of loss is unrelated to the
percentage of damages, there is not necessarily a proportional reduc-
tion in the parties' liabilities to each other relative to the net innocent
damages suffered."'-
Absent a rational fault-based principle governing the division of
the obligations of joint judgment debtors, the Florida Legislature
initially adopted the straightforward pro rata contribution approach. 62
This approach does not fully implement the intent of pure compara-
tive negligence; but it is efficient and is the most rational means of
allocating joint tortfeasor liability1 63 Furthermore, while the doctrine
of set-off would create problems in any scheme of loss distribution, a
pro rata contribution scheme would offer some solutions if set-off
applied. The loss distribution scheme of the initial Florida act and
of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, applied to the
Table 1/Table 5 hypothetical, effects a transfer of liability more
closely consistent with the no-fault aspect of pure comparative
negligence. The pro rata scheme of the Uniform Act retains joint and
159. See generally Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
160. The total percentage of negligence computed by the jury must equal 100.
Because the jury is instructed to compute the plaintiff's negligence, the defendant at
bar is responsible for injuries caused by any unnamed "phantom" tortfeasors. See
Gutierrez v. Murdock, 300 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), discussed in text
accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
161. Total negligence is 100%, and total damages suffered is 100%. The percentage
of negligence proportionately equals the reduction effected only where one party suffers
damages or where all parties suffer damages in the same dollar amount.
162. As noted earlier, Florida followed the pro rata scheme for one year. See
note 131 and text accompanying note 133 supra.
163. See generally George & Walkowiak, Blame and Reparation in Pure Compara-
tive Negligence: The Multi-Party Action, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 1 (1976).
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several liability, but permits the tortfeasors to share losses among
themselves once liability has been established and once one tortfeasor
has paid more than his pro rata share.'M It is important to note that
since the liability of the joint tortfeasors is initially joint and several,
a claimant may collect judgment in full against any judgment debtor.
Risk of loss for an insolvent joint tortfeasor in a normal action then
falls upon the judgment debtors. 6 '
Applying the pro rata scheme to the Table 1/Table 5 hypothetical,
if C collected his entire judgment of $5,400 from B, B is entitled to
recover $2,700 (the excess of B's pro rata share) in contribution from
A. 166 This is straightforward. But problems immediately arise, even
in a pro rata system, upon application of set-off and the Hoffman
court's requirement that there be a single judgment as between the
parties. Thus, in a multiple action with three potential tortfeasors
and three potential claimants, each entitled to a judgment and each
subject to liability, application of the set-off doctrine might result
in any of the variations shown in Table 16.167
TABLE 16
Variation 1
A's verdict of $11,250
less B's verdict of 13,300
B is entitled to $ 2,050
C's verdict of $ 5,400
less B's unsatisfied 2,050
A or B pay C $ 3,350
Assuming that the contribution statute is
literally applied, if C collects his full judg-
ment from either A or B, the paying
party is entitled to pro rata contribution
(1/2 of $3,350) from the non-paying party.
164. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § l(b).
165. Contrast this result with that reached under an apportionment scheme. See
note 135 supra.
166. Likewise, if A collected his $11,250 judgment from B, B is entitled to recover
one-half of that amount in contribution from C. And if B collects his $13,300 judgment
from C, C is entitled to recover one-half of that amount in contribution from A.
167. Table 16 is derived from the Table 1/Table 5 hypothetical. A Table 16-type
loss distribution pattern was initially imposed upon the Bournazian parties by the
Supreme Court of Florida. See text accompanying notes 72-79 supra.
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Variation 2
A's verdict of $11,250
less C's verdict of 5,400
A is entitled to $ 5,850
B's verdict of 13,300
less A's unsatisfied 5,850
A or C pay B $ 7,450
Assuming that the contribution statute is
literally applied, if B collects his full judg-
ment from either A or C, the paying party
is entitled to pro rata contribution (1/2 of
$7,450) from the non-paying party.
Variation 3
B's verdict of $13,300
less C's verdict of 5,400
B is entitled to $ 7,900
A's verdict of $11,250
less B's unsatisfied 7,900
B or C pay A $ 3,350
Assuming that the contribution statute is
literally applied, if A collects his full judg-
ment from either B or C, the paying party
is entitled to pro rata contribution (1/2 of
$3,350) from the non-paying party.
"The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who
has paid more than his pro rata share . ...",161 Until a court interprets
the quoted clause more consistently with the purposes of pure com-
parative negligence, it may be assumed that the right to receive con-
tribution is contingent upon a distribution of cash.
Suppose, however, that the doctrine of set-off applies when the
parties are insured-as it was applied by the Supreme Court of Florida
in the original Bournazian decision. If set-off were interpreted as a
court-imposed satisfaction of a legal liability, an insured might then
look to his liability insurer for indemnification. The verdict rendered
168. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS Acr § 1(b).
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against a tortfeasor could be treated as a liability which must be
satisfied by set-off. Unsatisfied damages would be collectible from the
opposing party's liability insurer, and the amount of the verdict's
set-off against liability would be reimbursed by the claimant's own
liability insurer. 169 Thus, using Variation 1 of Table 16 as an example,
the following scheme of loss distribution might evolve: 170 A's liability
insurer reimburses him for his innocent damages of $11,250 which
were judicially set off against B's judgment; B's liability insurer re-
imburses him for his innocent damages of $13,300 which were judicially
set off against A's and C's judgments; C's liability insurer reimburses
him for his innocent damages of $2,050 which were judicially set off
against B's judgment; C may then execute judgment against A or B
for his remaining innocent damages of $3,350.171 This approach would
have the advantage of encouraging first-person coverage from the in-
sured's own insurance company for the amount of damages set off by
liability. In dramatic fashion, such an approach would illustrate yet
another basic, but unfulfilled, nonfault aspect of the pure comparative
negligence rule as a loss transference mechanism. Given the inherent
problems of this indirect solution, however, it undoubtedly would
have been unpalatable to the court which initially rejected the
opportunity to frontally attack the loss distribution problem in
Bournazian. Such a solution was rendered procedurally unnecessary
when the court, on rehearing Bournazian, finally did confront one
aspect of the loss distribution problem presented when the liability
insurer for a tortfeasor is a named defendant.
169. Most general liability policies provide that a liability insurance company has
an obligation to pay for all the insureds' bodily injury or property damages and for all
sums for which the insured becomes liable. The doctrine of set-off could be interpreted
as requiring a liable insured to "pay" damages by excusing an opposing party's liability
to him. It is a basic concept of liability insurance that the liability insurer will reimburse
its insureds for the insureds' "covered expenditures."
170. Using Variation 2 from Table 16 as an example, the following scheme would
emerge: A's liability insurer would reimburse him for his innocent damages of $11,250
which were set off against B's and C's judgments; C's liability insurer would reimburse
him for his innocent damages which were set off against A's judgment; B's liability in-
surer would reimburse him for the $5,850 set-off against A's judgment; B may then
execute judgment against A or C for his unsatisfied innocent damages of $7,450. Using
Variation 3 of Table 16 as an example, the following scheme would emerge: B's liability
insurer would reimburse him for the $13,300 set-off against A's and C's judgments; C's
liability insurer would reimburse him for the $5,400 set-off against B's judgment; A's
liability insurer would reimburse him for the $7,900 set-off against B's judgment; A may
then execute against B or C for his remaining innocent damages of $3,350. See note 171
infra.
171. There is no conflict with the insureds' duty to cooperate, as set-off is imposed
by the court.
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CONCLUSION
The Hoffman court willingly accepted the burden of fashioning
a more equitable basis for distributing losses suffered in accidents.
Implicit in the Hoffman decision is the conclusion that loss shifting
through loss sharing is a more efficient and just economic system than
retention of the all-or-nothing approach of the contributory negligence
rule. While the Florida Legislature also attempted to breathe life into
an antiquated system of secondary loss allocation, the adoption of fault-
based contribution principles serves only to frustrate the Hoffman
court's noble experiment in common law adjustment of parties' rights.
And as Bournazian illustrates, the doctrine of set-off is incompatible
with the equitable foundation of the pure comparative negligence
rule. Fortunately, the Supreme Court of Florida partially recognized
the inadequacies of the system of loss allocation created by its initial
Bournazian decision. On rehearing, the court abandoned the concept
of set-off to the extent that insurance covers parties' mutual liabilities.
The economic effect, however, is the same-as between two parties
insured against liability. The innocent losses are interpersonally spread
through the preferred loss distributor without being subject to a
second unnecessary reduction. The disadvantage is that such a system,
while in the guise of a radical new approach to loss allocation, does
little to alleviate the problems of the costs of secondary loss distribution.
The decision on rehearing continued the inexorable trend toward total
insurability of injuries. Nevertheless, there will be a realization of
the further inadequacies of the present fault-based system of loss alloca-
tion as fault-related litigation becomes more and more complex, and
as increasingly large percentages of the insurance premium dollar are
expended in secondary loss distribution under the pure comparative
negligence/proportional contribution scheme. Realization of the in-
adequacies of the present system will accelerate the advent of pure,
first-person, no-fault loss distribution of tort injuries based upon
participation in an injury-causing enterprise.
[5:66
PURE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
APPENDICES
Both the Bournazian original opinion and the opinion on rehearing are included in
the following appendices for the convenience of the reader.
APPENDIX A
Stuyvesant Insurance Co. v. Bournazian
Supreme Court of Florida
March 10, 1976
(WITHDRAWN AND SUPERSEDED)
ENGLAND, J.
This case was certified to us by the Second District Court of Appeal as posing a
question of great public interest. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section
3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
This action arose from an accident between an automobile owned and driven by
Royce Bournazian and an automobile owned by Paul Riley and driven by his wife
Betty. Royce Bournazian filed a personal injury suit against the Rileys and petitioner,
the Rileys' automobile liability insurer. Mrs. Bournazian filed a derivative claim as a
result of the injuries to her husband. Betty Riley counterclaimed against Royce
Bournazian and his liability insurer (Allstate Insurance Company) for the injuries
sustained by her, and Paul Riley filed a derivative claim against them for the injuries
to his wife.
Separate jury verdicts were returned for each litigant on his or her claim. Royce
Bournazian was awarded $8,500, and his wife $1,500, against both Rileys and their
insurer. Betty Riley was awarded $19,000, and her husband $1,000, against Royce
Bournazian and his insurer. The trial court aggregated the personal injury verdicts for
both Bournazians and netted them against the aggregate awards for both Rileys,
producing a net judgment of $10,000 for the Rileys. On appeal the district court
reversed and awarded each verdict recipient the full amount of his or her individual
award.1 The effect of that opinion is to hold both insurance companies liable for the
full amount assessed against their insureds.
Both the trial court and the district court attempted to apply the "set-off" theory
which this Court announced in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1973). Their
difficulty in applying Hoffman stems from the fact that the decision there involved a
significantly different fact situation. In Hoffman, both the plaintiff and defendant were
individual, uninsured litigants. The set-off principle announced there for comparative
negligence cases in Florida does not easily translate to cases which involve multiple
parties and their insurers.
Our consideration of this problem begins with a recognition of the legal principle
that the liability of the insurers in this case is derivative only, representing a responsibility
to pay an amount first determined to be owed by another.2 Applying that principle
to this case requires that we first determine how much each individual owes,3 and
it is in that context that the Hoffman rationale of set-off can be usefully applied. Direct
offsets can (and should) be applied whenever the identity of the parties permits.
By that means, the net liability among individual parties can be calculated as follows:
(1) Royce Bournazian was found to be liable to Betty Riley for $19,000, and
she was found to be liable to him for $8,500. As between them, he owes her $10,500.
(2) Royce was also found to be liable to Paul Riley for $1,000, but Paul was found
1. Bournazian v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 303 So.2d 71 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1974).
2. Section 624.605(b), FLA. STAT.
3. The fact that an injured person may proceed directly against the insurer as a
third party beneficiary of the insurance contract, Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713
(Fla. 1969), in no way elevates the carrier's responsibility to pay amounts for which
the injured himself would not have been liable.
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to be liable (along with Betty) to Royce for the $8,500 award. As between Paul
and Royce, it would appear that Paul would owe Royce $7,500. Paul's liability is
joint with Betty, however, and as such it would be subject to discharge by her payment
or satisfaction. Since payment of the entire $8,500 was discharged by Betty's and
Royce's offsetting judgments, it follows that Paul is entitled to receive $1,000 from
Royce because there is nothing left of the $8,500 to offset that award.
(3) Linda Bournazian is owed $1,500 by Paul and Betty Riley jointly, without any
offsetting liability by her to them.
By identifying the liability of the individuals in this manner, a determination of
the derivative liability of the insurers becomes mechanical. It follows from the primary
determination of liability that the Rileys' insurer should pay $1,500 to Linda Bournazian
and that Royce Bournazian's insurer should pay $10,500 to Betty Riley and $1,000 to
Paul Riley.4 After these cash payments have been made, the jury verdicts will have
been accurately and fully reflected in the combined dollar and "offset" transfers. Royce
Bournazian will have "received" the $8,500 he was awarded, in the form of a partial
discharge of his dollar obligation to Betty Riley. Linda Bournazian will have received
in cash her exact jury award. Betty Riley will have "received" $19,000, $10,500 in cash
and another $8,500 in the form of a complete discharge of her dollar obligation to
Royce Bournazian. Paul Riley will have received his jury award of $1,000 in cash.
Viewed another way, the dollar effect of these transfers requires the insurance
carriers to pay only $13,000 in claims.5 That sum is precisely the net amount of
the mutual liabilities of the parties who are obliged to each other, either jointly or
individually, by the jury awards.
The decision of the Second District Court of Appeal is quashed and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HATCHETT, J.; and MORPHONIOS, Circuit Court Judge, Concur
ALDERMAN, Circuit Court Judge, Concurs with an opinion
ADKINS, J., Dissents with an opinion, with which ROBERTS, Acting
Chief Justice, Concurs
James E. Alderman, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion by Justice England, however I wish to make
these additional observations.
The view of the dissenting opinion is that liability insurance carriers should
not be allowed to use the set-off principle to reduce their liability because this is
not a "socially desirable method of loss distribution." Perhaps this is true and maybe
there are better methods, but I question whether the court is in the best position
to make that determination.
It is suggested that on the basis of public policy, we should nullify the provisions
of liability insurance policies that make insurers responsible only for what their
insureds are legally obligated to pay. Such judicial surgery, would, no doubt, have
the effect of increasing the amount of liability payments by insurance companies. The
persons receiving the extra payments certainly would benefit because they would receive
more money than if they had sued uninsured persons, who in turn would have been
able to set-off the amount of any counter-judgment. If insurance companies had in-
exhaustible sources of money, there would be no problem. Unfortunately, this is not
the case. If they must pay out more than their individual insureds owe, then in the
long run the costs of insurance will be higher. Ultimately, someone is going to have
to pay this additional cost.
4. Direct cash payments to these judgments creditors assures that each spouse will
receive an amount which Florida law treats as his or her separate property. Section
708.08(1), FLA. STAT.
5. Under the trial court's view of set-off, the carriers would pay out $10,000, while
under the district court's view they would pay out $80,000.
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I believe Justice England has correctly stated the existing law of Florida. If that
law should be changed because another method of loss distribution is more "socially
desirable", then in my opinion, the change should be made by the people of Florida
through their legislative representatives.
ADKINS, J., dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this cause.
I concur with the District Court that liability insurance carriers should not be
allowed to use the set-off principle announced in Hoffman v. Jones to reduce their
liability. It was our hope that the result reached therein would create a more equitable
system of determining liability and a more socially desirable method of loss distribution.
The majority's decision in the case at bar distributing the loss from the shoulders of
the parties' liability insurance carriers to the injured parties does not create a more
socially desirable method of loss distribution.
It was entirely proper that the respective verdicts for the parties be set off. However,
set-offs among the parties should not diminish the responsibility of the liability insurance
carriers. For example, if a jury awards a plaintiff counter-defendant $8000 on the
main claim and awards the defendant counter-plaintiff $8000 on the counterclaim,
the respective verdicts should be set off. However, the liability insurance carrier for
each party should still be responsible to the other party for $8000.00. In this way
each party would be compensated for its injury from the liability carrier of the other
party, with the liability carriers paying out $16000, the exact amount found by the
jury to be owing. Under the holding of the majority, liability insurance carriers will
escape liability, thereby profiting from the offsetting verdicts.
A person purchases automobile liability insurance coverage so that the insurer,
and not the individual, will be financially responsible up to the policy limits for
the damages caused by the individual. The fact that damages are owed to the individual
by virtue of the negligence of a third party should not benefit the individual's liability
insurance carrier, or reduce the amount of damages owed by the liability insurance
carrier. If an insured has caused damages, those damages should be paid by the
liability insurance carrier; whereas, if the insured is entitled to collect damages from a
third party, such monies are owed to the insured and not to the liability insurance
carrier.
As applied to the facts in the case at bar, under the majority's holding the
insurers must pay out $13000.00. Under the holding of the District Court, with which
I agree, the insurers must pay out $30000, the exact amount found by the jury to be
owing. Thus under the facts in the instant case, the liability insurance carriers are
provided with a windfall totalling $17000, and the injured parties are aggrieved to the
tune of $17000.00.
In the words of Judge Grimes in the decision sub judice:
"The only parties who profited from the offsetting verdicts were the two insurance
companies. Had the Bournazians' claims been prosecuted in one suit and the
Rileys' claims in another, both insurance carriers would have been liable for
the total of the resulting verdicts. By reason of the claims being tied together,
Stuyvesant was relieved from liability largely because of the serious nature of
its insured's injuries and Allstate's liability was reduced for the same reason. Such
a result flies in the face of the social desirability of providing automobile accident
victims in Florida with reasonable access to liability insurance benefits. See
Shingleton v. Bussey, Fla. 1969, 223 So.2d 713."
The majority attempts to justify its holding on "the legal principle that the liability
of the insurers in this case is derivative only, representing a responsibility to pay an
amount first determined to be owed by another." I agree with Judge Grimes' response
sub judice to that principle:
"This result does not violate the concept that the liability of the insured is a
condition precedent to the liability of his insurer. The liability of the insureds
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as reflected by the verdicts will be taken into account in the rendition of the
judgments. For example, the liability of Paul to Royce established in this case
was $8,500, which is exactly the amount that Paul's insurer will be obligated
to pay. Royce's judgment against Paul will be reduced to $7,500 only because
Royce had a corresponding liability of $1,000 to Paul. The fact that there
were offsets among the parties does not diminish the responsibility of the liability
insurance carriers. It must be remembered that in Florida, persons injured by
reason of the negligence of an insured are third party beneficiaries of the
insured's liability insurance contract. Shingleton v. Bussey, supra."
Addressing the question of contractual provisions in insurance policies which collide
with considerations of public policy, Justice Ervin in Shingleton v. Bussey, supra,
stated:
"It can hardly be disputed that motor vehicle liability insurance is a subject
necessarily lending itself to regulation imposed by the State in the exercise of its
police power. It is a subject affected with a public interest and its regulation
in a multiple of ways for the protection of the general public has become of
more and more importance in the passage of years and changing times. This
being the case, it is not unreasonable to restrict or limit the effect of express
contractual provisions where the same collide with those considerations which
affect the interests of the public generally." p. 717
Accordingly, I would hold that where a set-off results in a judgment against the
insurer for more than a judgment against its insured, an exception based on public
policy should be carved out of the provisions in a liability insurance policy that an
insurer is only responsible for sums for which a judgment has been entered against
its insured, or for sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay. The
rationale for such an exception being that the judgments would have been identical
but for the set-off allowed to the insured and not to the insurer.
Although research has revealed no case dealing with the issue sub judice, com-
mentators generally favor excluding insurers from the set-off process. Schwartz, Pure
Comparative Negligence in Action, 34 ATL. L.J. 117 (1972); Flynn, Comparative
Negligence: The Debate, 8 Trial 49 (May/June 1972); Pure Comparative Negligence
In Florida: A New Adventure In The Common Law, 28 U. Miami L.REv. 737 (1974).
Based on the reasoning expressed herein, I would adopt the majority opinion of
Judge Grimes of the District Court of Appeal as the opinion of this Court.
ROBERTS, Acting Chief Justice, Concurs
APPENDIX B
Stuyvesant Insurance Co. v. Bournazian
Supreme Court of Florida
December 16, 1976
ON REHEARING GRANTED
ENGLAND, J.
This case was certified to us by the Second District Court of Appeal as posing a
question of great public interest. We accepted jurisdiction pursuant to Article V,
Section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, considered arguments and briefs, and
rendered an opinion on March 10, 1976 from which two of six members of the
Court dissented. On consideration of respondents' request for reconsideration we again
heard oral argument. We now revisit our original opinion in its entirety.
This action arose from an accident between an automobile owned and driven by
Royce Bournazian and an automobile owned by Paul Riley and driven by his wife
Betty. Royce Bournazian filed a personal injury suit against the Rileys and Stuyvesant
Insurance Company, the Rileys' automobile liability insurer. Mrs. Bournazian filed a
derivative claim as a result of the injuries to her husband. Betty Riley counterclaimed
against Royce Bournazian and his liability insurer (Allstate Insurance Company) for
[5:66
PURE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
the injuries sustained by her, and Paul Riley filed a derivative claim against them
for the injuries to his wife.
Separate jury verdicts were returned for each litigant on his or her claim in a trial
conducted under the doctrine of comparative negligence. Royce Bournazian was awarded
$8,500, and his wife $1,500, against both Rileys and their insurer. Betty Riley was
awarded $19,000, and her husband $1,000, against Royce Bournazian and his insurer.
The trial court aggregated the personal injury verdicts for both Bournazians and
netted them against the aggregate awards for both Rileys, producing a net judgment
of $10,000 for the Rileys. On appeal the district court reversed and awarded each
verdict recipient the full amount of his or her individual award.1 The effect of
that decision was to hold both insurance companies liable for the full amount assessed
by the jury against their insureds, with no dollar off-sets between identical party-
insureds. We now conclude that the result reached by the district court was correct. 2
In our initial opinion we began with a recognition of the legal principle that the
liability of the insurers in this case is derivative only, representing a responsibility to
pay an amount first determined to be owed by another.a We then endeavored to
determine how much each individual owed, and in doing so we held that the
Hoffman principle of set-off should be applied when the identity of the parties would
permit. As a result, we "netted" the individual liability of each party to the other
before determining what the insurance company for each would pay, with the follow-
ing results:
(1) Since Royce Bournazian was found to be liable to Betty Riley for $19,000, and
she was found to be liable to him for $8,500, we found that the net amount he owed
her was $10,500.
(2) Since Royce was found to be liable to Paul Riley for $1,000, and Paul was
found to be liable (along with Betty) to Royce for the $8,500 award, we found
that the net amount Paul would owe to Royce was $7,500. Because Paul's liability is
joint with Betty, however, and therefore subject to discharge by her payment or satisfac-
tion, we found that payment of the entire $8,500 was discharged by Betty's and Royce's
offsetting judgments, so that on balance Paul was entitled to receive $1,000 from
Royce.4
(3) Linda Bournazian was found to be entitled to $1,500 from Paul and Betty
Riley jointly, without any offsetting liability by her to them.
By determining each insurer's liability after applying offsets between identical
parties, the insurance carriers became obligated by our original decision to pay $13,000
in claims.
We are- now persuaded that our original view as to the amount to be paid among
the parties themselves was correct for the reasons announced in Hoffman, but that the
1. Bournazian v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 303 So.2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
2. Both the trial court and the district court attempted to apply the "set-off"
theory which this Court announced in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1973).
Their difficulty in applying Hoffman stems from the fact that the decision there
involved a significantly different fact situation. Plaintiff and defendant there, both of
whom were negligent, were the only parties to the litigation. The question of insurers'
liability was not involved in the case.
3. Section 624.605(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (1975). The fact that an injured person may
proceed directly against the insurer as a third party beneficiary of the insurance con-
tract, Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969), in no way elevates the carrier's
responsibility to pay amounts for which the insured himself would not have been
liable.
4. In offsetting Royce Bournazian's $8,500 judgment against Betty Riley's $19,000
judgment, the positions of the Rileys in this lawsuit would in no way be undermined
since we are not here concerned with a dispute between persons jointly liable as to
the impact of the joint judgment on separate judgments in favor of each.
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notion of set-off should have no effect on the contractual obligation of liability insurance
carriers to pay the amounts for which their insureds are legally responsible. Stuyvesant
argues that the amount legally owed by each party to the other is the net amount
receivable after set-off has been applied, rather than the total amount awarded to
each by a jury after comparing relative fault and damages. This restrictive view of
"liability" is defective in a case tried under comparative negligence, however. The
effect of set-off as an antecedent to payment by each insurer is to abrogate the parties'
respective insurance contracts by providing an unwarranted second level of comparative
recovery reductions-the jury's award being the first.
The term "set-off" as used in Hoffman was obviously applied in a non-technical
sense. Under the common law, a defensive plea of set-off would not exist in the
compulsory counterclaim situation which arises in every comparative negligence case.5
In Hoffman we used the term "set-off" merely to explain to trial judges that they
should enter a net judgment for the party predominantly prevailing in the particular
lawsuit, just as is typically done in contract litigation where one party sues for failure to
make payment and the other counterclaims for a failure to perform.6 A net judgment
would be entered in such cases even though separate jury verdicts for each party were
generated from separate causes of action, the promises of the parties not being re-
garded as mutually dependent at common law.7
Hoffman established the principle of set-off as between injured parties liable to
each other in order to avoid an unnecessary exchange of checks and the possibility
of inequitable judgment executions. Set-off in comparative negligence cases, then, is
no more than a mechanical device by which the court forces partial payment of an
amount the jury has determined to be legally owing.
When the jury in this case fixed the dollar amounts owed by each party to the
other, it had already reduced the full amount of each party's actual damages by his
or her respective degree of responsibility for the accident. The verdicts resulting from
trial determined the "legal liability" of each party for purposes of Section 624.605(l)(b),
Fla. Stat. (1975).8 It was at that point that the terms of each insurance contract
brought into effect the duty of each liability insurer to pay what its insured owed.
Were we to hold that each insurance carrier could "recoup" its insured's financial
liability to other parties, we would materially vary the terms of each liability insurance
contract. For example, the jury here determined that Royce Bournazian was entitled
to receive $8,500 from Betty Riley. If recoupment is allowed for the insurer to the
extent of the $19,000 which Royce owed Betty, then (i) he would receive nothing
from her carrier despite its contract liability to pay the amounts for which Betty
became legally liable, and (ii) Betty would receive $10,500 from Royce's carrier despite
5. See, for example, Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 151 Fla. 134, 9 So.2d
361 (1942). If "set-off" were used in the technical sense, unrelated liabilities could
be used to reduce the insurer's contractual obligation. For example, if at the time of the
accident, Linda Bournazian had been indebted to Betty Riley for $2,000 under a past
due promissory note, Betty and Paul could "set-off" that debt against their new
$1,500 liability to Linda. Not only would Linda go uncompensated for her loss in
this accident, but the Riley's insurer would be fortuitously relieved of its contract
responsibility to pay an amount for which the Rileys had been found liable in negligence
and Betty would have lost the right to recover $1,500 of her $2,000 promissory note.
Hoffman never contemplated such a result. The set-off notion there announced is
obviously applicable only to the mutual legal obligations of two or more persons
arising from a single tortious event.
6. See, for example, Ocean Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Quality Plastering, Inc., 247
So.2d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
7. 3A A. COPRIN, CONTRACrS § 709 (1960).
8. In this section, "liability insurance" is defined as "insurance against legal
liability .... "
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its contract liability to pay all amounts for which he became legally liable. The effect
of so holding would be tantamount to our requiring Royce to pay to Betty $8,500 of
the $19,000 which Allstate had contracted to pay as a result of the accident. Nothing
in Hoffman, the insurance laws, or the public policy of this state justifies our reading
into a standard automobile liability insurance contract a requirement that a partially-
negligent but fully-insured person should absorb a portion of the cost of his negligence.
The purpose of the contract is precisely to the contrary, being designed and paid for
to relieve the insured of all such obligations (within policy limits and over agreed
deductibles, of course).
We conclude, therefore, that the concept of "set-off" (more properly "recoupment")
as announced in Hoffman applies only between uninsured parties to a negligence action,
or to insured parties to the extent that insurance does not cover their mutual liabilities.
The doctrine has no effect on the contractual obligations of liability insurance carriers.
The district court reached the correct result, and our previous opinion is withdrawn and
superseded by this decision.
The judgment below is affirmed.
OVERTON, C. J., ADKINS, BOYD, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and ROBERTS (Re-
tired), JJ., Concur
